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INTRODUCTION 
Nature of the Study 
/' 
In 1941 the Puerto Rican government embarked upon a comprehensive 
program of social alnd economic reform. As the following figures indi­
cate, the program has generated dramatic changes in the Puerto Rican 
economy. Between 1946 and 1962, real per capita income has grown at an 
average rate of 4.7 percent per year (36, pp. 463-464). Employment in 
manufacturing has gone from less than 5 percent of the labor force in 
1940 to 23 percent in 1961 (32, p. 104; 17, p. A-22). Agricultural em­
ployment has dropped from over 60 percent in 1940 to 23 percent in 1961 
(32, p. 90; 17, p. A-22). In the remainder of the labor force there has 
been a shift toward higher paid employment in government and the service 
industries. Thus, during the period ending in 1961 and 1962, the econo­
my has been transformed from a stagnant agricultural economy into a 
growing diversified economy. The genesis of this development is found 
in the agrarian reform activities of the 1940's. The basis for these 
activities was the Land Law of 1941, the first major reform legislation 
(19). Embodied in the Law were three major activities. First, a program 
whereby lands held by "unnatural persons," (e.g., corporations and trusts) 
in excess of 500 acres were to be acquired by the government and operated 
as proportional profit farms. Second, the Law established a mechanism 
for the resettlement of rural agricultural workers who had no tenure 
rights in their homesites. These people were to be given government 
land in communities developed for this purpose. Third, a program for the 
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acquisition of lands and their division into family farms was contained 
in the Law. These programs were administered by the Land Authority of 
Puerto Rico, an agency created by the Land Law for this express purpose. 
The Land Law of 1941 was designed to improve the conditions prevail­
ing in the economy of Puerto Rico prior to 1940, Since the first decade 
of the twentieth century, sugar had been the dominant crop in what was 
largely an agricultural economy. The sugar industry itself was domina­
ted by large scale plantations exhibiting a high degree of absentee 
ownership. With a few minor exceptions, organized labor was fragmented 
and unable to achieve any degree of sustained success. Minimum wage laws 
introduced in the early 30*s were widely evaded. Independent growers of 
sugar cane felt that the mills ware treating them unfairly as to the 
terms under which their cane was processed. The limited industrial ac­
tivity that took place in Puerto Rico was predominantly a technical ad­
junct to the sugar industry. A large needlework cottage industry had 
developed, but was peripheral to the central economic activity involving 
sugar. This, briefly, was the nature of the pre-1940 economy which will 
be discussed at more length later in the report. 
The research reported in this study was directed toward an analysis 
of one phase of the agrarian reform program — the proportional profit 
farm activity. This aspect of the program has entailed the transfer of 
a portion of the Puerto Rican sugar industry from private to public^ 
ownership. Additionally, the lands so transferred have been organized 
into a unique system of management and distribution of product. Finally, 
the operating history of the proportional profit farm system coincides 
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with a period in which significant progress has been made in the overall 
development of the Puerto Rican economy. 
Only one comprehensive study has been undertaken dealing with this 
subject. Walter Packard published a monograph in 1948 (27) that analyzed 
the early years of the Land Authority's activities. Packard's work, 
while comprehensive, dealt only with the years up to 1948 and covered 
only one project out of seven that were to be operated by the Authority. 
This one project was the first acquired by the Authority. Land was still 
being acquired and the remaining projects organized when Packard under­
took his study. Perloff (28) and Koenig (18) make references to the 
Authority's programs, but do not undertake a major analysis. The work 
by Steward and his associates (38) examined a community adjacent to a 
proportional profit farm from the viewpoint of the cultural anthropolo­
gist. The study is useful in that it provides insights into the cultural 
dynamics of the system. There is, however, a need to study this institu­
tion in depth. With pressures for land reform mounting throughout the 
underdeveloped nations of the world, the Puerto Rican experience can 
provide useful guidelines for future efforts. In addition, it will be 
useful in advancing our understanding of the dynamics of the Puerto Rican 
economy to examine this phase of the reform program. 
Objectives and Hypotheses 
This study was undertaken in order to fill the gaps in our knowl­
edge of this institution. The objectives of the study are threefold: 
1) to determine the degree to which the operations of the proportional 
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profit farm system have achieved the goals set for it in the Land Law of 
1941, 2) to examine the way in \diich the operation has contributed to, 
or detracted from, the ability of the economy to achieve its broader 
goals of economic development, and 3) to determine the failure and suc­
cess elements of the program as they relate to the findings associated 
with objectives 1) and 2). 
This general statement of objectives leads to the primary phase of 
a research project, i.e., the development of hypotheses to be tested. 
The hypotheses directing this study have been drawn from a number of 
sources and are grouped according to their relationship to the above 
stated objectives. The first set of hypotheses relate to the first ob­
jective, i.e., the degree to which the proportional profit farm system 
has achieved the goals set for it in the Land Law of 1941. The Law was 
quite specific as to the goals set for the program. They were the elim­
ination of corporate latifundia and the maintenance of production ef­
ficiency on the lands acquired. In formulating the Law, the government 
was attempting to break the dominant position held by the sugar industry 
in Puerto Rican society prior to 1940. The critics of the industry did 
not base their attacks on alleged inefficiencies in the sugar industry, 
but on the broader implications of the situation. As one writer has 
stated, "The objection to large plantations controlled by the sugar 
companies is not that the latter are poor farmers. The contrary is the 
case. The basic difficulty is, of course, that the plantation system 
provides a wholly unsatisfactory social structure" (15, p. 6). It was 
felt that by divesting the large corporate producers of their land 
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holdings, progress could then be made in diversifying the economy and 
broadening the effective participation of the population in the political 
process.^ These had been things opposed by the industry prior to 1940 
and will be discussed more fully later in the paper. 
In addition to these clearly stated goals, there were two goals 
implicit in the- Land Law. Both of these implicit goals dealt with the 
profit distribution mechanism. First, it was felt that labor was not 
receiving its "fair" share of the gross income of the sugar industry. 
The profit sharing mechanism was designed to overcome this by increasing 
labor's share of the product. Second, the framers of the Law felt that 
profit sharing could lead to some form of worker participation in deci­
sion making.^ 
From these goals, we derive the set of hypotheses related to the 
first objective. They are: 
1) The Land Authority eliminated corporate latifundia in Puerto 
Rico. 
2) The Land Authority's holdings were operated in an economically 
efficient manner. 
3) Profit sharing has increased labor's share of the total product 
in the proportional profit farm system. 
4) Worker participation in the decision making process has de­
veloped. 
^Acosta Velarde, Jose. First Director, Land Authority of Puerto 
Rico. San Juan, P.R. Interview. Private communication. 1963. 
^Golon Torres, Ramon. Former Director, Social Programs Administra­
tion. San Juan, P.R. Interview. Private communication. 1963. 
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The second objective deals with the way in which the proportional 
profit farm system is related to the overall development of the Puerto 
Rican economy. The goals of economic policy have been set by the govern­
ment of Puerto Rico to be growth in per capita income, diversification 
of the economy, and full employment (37, pp. 11-24). As a creation of 
the Puerto Rican government, the Land Authority should be expected to 
pursue policies consistent with these broader economic goals. There is 
one aspect of the proportional profit farm system that might be expected 
to conflict with the goal of economic growth. Since the resources of 
the Land Authority could be used for government investment programs, we 
might be concerned with the distribution of profits. By depriving the 
government of much needed capital, one might expect profit sharing to 
have a depressing effect on the rate of growth of the economy. This 
would be so because of the critical nature of government investment in 
providing the infrastructure necessary to create the base for other in­
vestments. 
Given the profit distribution, there are other ways in which the 
Authority can have an impact on the economy. The level of output on 
the farms will have an impact on growth through the export sector. At 
the same time, the manner in which this output is achieved will have 
significance as regards the level of employment. For example, the 
Authority may employ a production function using heavy capital inputs, 
when a different function cbuld be used employing heavy labor inputs. 
The choice would have an impact on the level of employment, and would 
depend upon the level of employment in the economy. 
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Based on what has been said above, the second objective yields the 
following two hypotheses: 
5) The operating policies of the Land Authority have been consis­
tent with the overall goals of growth and full employment. 
6) By diverting resources from public investment, profit distribu­
tion on the proportional profit farms has had a negative impact 
on the rate of growth of the economy. 
The third and final objective deals with the identification of the 
failure and success of the program. For example, if in testing the 
second hypothesis, it is found that the Land Authority was not operated 
in an economically efficient manner, the next step is to determine why 
this was so. The problem is to identify the causes behind this failure 
to operate efficiently. The cause, or causes, may be found in the 
nature of the proportional profit farm, in a conflict of goals, or in 
some combination of these two. As far as possible, the failure and 
success elements will be identified. Where these elements cannot be 
identified, or vAiere the results are inconclusive, we have delimited 
an area of needed research. Clearly, these steps cannot be carried out 
until the primary hypotheses have been tested. The testing of these 
hypotheses will require a variety of techniques, the discussion of which 
follows. 
Analytical Techniques 
Based on the analytical techniques that are pertinent, the hypotheses 
developed above may be divided into two major categories. Hypotheses 1 
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and 4 dealing with the elimination of corporate latifundia and the 
development of worker participation in management may be tested by des­
criptive techniques. By comparing the situation prior to passage of 
the Land Law with that prevailing under the Land Law, these two hypothe­
ses may be tested. 
The remaining hypotheses require somewhat more complicated testing 
procedures. These hypotheses can be further divided into two sub-
groupings. The first group, including hypotheses 2 and 3 dealing tirith 
production efficiency and the share of total product going to labor will 
be tested at the microeconomic level. The efficiency of the proportion­
al profit farms will be tested through a production function analysis. 
Fitting production functions to Land Authority data will provide an 
indication of the degree to which resource quantities employed deviate 
from their optimum levels — given the prevailing factor and product 
prices. However, this will yield us only a partial answer to the ques­
tion of efficiency of operation. Assuming that a deviation from an 
optimum input mix was found, it would be impossible at this stage to 
determine whether this deviation was unique to the Authority, or was the 
result of conditions affecting the sugar industry as a vmole. This 
would suggest a comparative analysis of the Land Authority's operations 
and comparable private operations. While data on the private sugar sec­
tor is not extensive, sufficient series are available to allow for cer­
tain general comparisons. Factors such as sugar yield, labor productivi­
ty, and wages will be compared as to average levels and trends. To the 
extent possible, production functions will be fit to data for the private 
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sector. These functions will be compared to the functions for the pub­
lic sector to determine comparative resource allocation. The comparison 
of the functions should provide some insights into the operation of both 
the public and private sectors. 
The remaining hypotheses, dealing with the consistency of the Land 
Authority's operations with the goals of economic growth and full em­
ployment, and the impact of profit sharing on economic growth will be 
tested with the tools of macroeconomics. These two hypotheses will be 
tested through the use of a multi-equation growth model. The model will, 
in reduced form, present the rate of growth of the Puerto Rican economy 
as a function of exogenous variables, one of which will be the output 
of the Land Authority. The model will be fully developed later, and the 
other exogenous variables specified. Varying the activities of the Au­
thority will yield alternative growth rates and employment levels con­
sistent with these rates. Thus, it will be possible to determine whether 
a different set of policies undertaken by the Authority would have been 
more or less favorable to the achievement of the overall policy goals. 
By varying the rules under which profits are distributed, the relation­
ship between profit sharing and growth will be studied. 
The remainder of this report will be devoted to the analysis and 
its development. The plan of this work is presented in the following 
section. 
Plan of Report 
The five chapters following this introduction make up the body of 
the report. The first chapter deals with an overview of the Land Law of 
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1941. A general view of developments in Puerto Rico prior to 1940 will 
illuminate the major factors that generated support for the reform move­
ment. Details surrounding the actual passage and testing of the law 
will be presented. Secondly, the major elements of the Law will be 
covered, noting their relationship to the situation prior to 1940. 
Finally, the organization of the Land Authority, as it has evolved, will 
be discussed, stating briefly its major land acquisitions and their dis­
position. 
The next chapter will present a detailed development of the analy­
tical framework. The analytical framework will provide the means by 
which the hypotheses may be tested and the objectives of the study 
achieved. The following two chapters will present the empirical analy­
sis. The first chapter will deal with the microeconomic analysis of 
the proportional profit farm system, both as with respect to the norms 
of economic efficiency and vis a vis the private sugar producers. The 
second of these two chapters will deal with analysis of the program as 
it relates to the overall economic development of the economy. This 
chapter will take the results of the microeconomic analysis and apply 
them to the growth model in order to appraise their macroeconomic im­
pact. 
Rounding out the report, the findings will be related to the original 
objectives of the study and integrated into a summary statement. Pro­
posals for future research will be presented. 
The question now arises as to lAat the Land Law of 1941 is and how 
did it come into being and evolve. 
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THE LAND LAW OF 1941 AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
Background to Reform 
The pressures, conflicts and unrest that led to passage of the Land 
Law were intimately related to developments in the sugar industry. Cap? 
ital from the United States flowed at a rapid rate into Puerto Rico dur­
ing the years following acquisition of the island. The initial impact 
of this investment was felt in the sugar industry and directly related 
activities (5, p. xxi). Sugar production rose rapidly from 39,200 tons 
in 1899 to over 200,000 tons in 1905 and continued steadily upward to 
1,103,822 tons in 1934 (10, p. 79). Acres of land planted to sugar cane 
increased from 72,146 in 1899 to 317,992 in 1934 (10, pp. 21, 105). Ac­
companying this development there occurred a centralization of control 
of the industry both in the production of cane and in its processing. 
Of the 152 sugar mills producing an average of 1,823 tons of sugar in 
1908, only 41 mills producing an average of 18,850 tons of sugar were in 
operation in 1935 (10, p. 61). The total rated mill capacity for the 
island was 61,960 tons of cane ground in a twenty-four hour period. Of 
this figure, 27,600 tons, or 45%, were under the ownership of four Ameri­
can, i.e., non-Puerto Rican, companies. In the crop year 1934-35 these 
companies ground 47% of the total sugar cane production of the island 
(10, pp. 79-82). 
Of the total 317,992 acres planted to sugar cane in 1934-35, 73,138 
acres or 23 percent, were controlled by these same four companies. Other 
sugar milling companies and their land holding subsidiaries controlled 
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90,862 acres of land planted to sugar cane making a total of 164,000 
acres, or 52 percent of the total. The degree of concentration among 
the sugar cane growers is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Distribution of farms by acreage in sugar cane, 1934-35* 
Cane acreage 
Farms Area in cane 
Number Percent of total Acres Percent of total 
0
 
1 o
 
5,641 73.32 19,239 6.05 
11 - 100 1,738 22.59 53,165 16.72 
101 - 500 255 3.32 55,357 17.41 
500 + 59 .77 190,231 59.82 
TOTAL 7,693 100.00 317,992 100.00 
^Source: (10, p. 105). 
It is clear that the sugar industry was dominated by a few sugar 
milling companies and a handful of independent growers. To a certain 
degree some concentration of control and coordination is inevitable and 
indeed desirable in sugar production. During the harvest season, cane 
must be cut according to a close schedule based upon the sugar content 
of the standing cane, and the grinding capacity of the mill. A very 
large number of independent growers, each with rather small lots of cane, 
makes it extremely difficult to maintain this desired schedule. The 
result is a higher cost of grinding, coupled with lower sugar yields 
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due to poor timing of harvest or loss of sugar in cane that has been cut 
but cannot be ground immediately. This is borne out by the experience 
of one mill in Puerto Rico that caters to small growers.^ As was pointed 
out above, opposition to the prevailing organization was not directed at 
concentration of ownership per se. The key was found in the subsidiary 
impact of this concentration on the social structure of the society. 
It would be incorrect to say that the "unsatisfactory social struc­
ture" referred to was the child of the plantation system alone. The 
roots of the structure go back well before the turn of the century. The 
20th century plantation system merely accentuated that which was already 
present. Sugar production in the 1800's was organized in a system of 
family haciendas tenuosly tied to the sugar market, but in most respects 
self sufficient. The grinding of cane and production of raw sugar was 
performed, in the main, by small mills on the hacienda. or in the case 
of smaller haciendas. at the mill of a neighbor. Labor on the hacienda 
was provided by resident "i Lies \rtvo held a distinct status in Puerto 
Rican society. They the ^^regados. were bound to the hacendado through 
a system of perquisites in the form of land granted for homesites, cre­
dit in the hacienda store (on the larger haciendas) and permission to 
maintain livestock and produce subsistence crops on land allocated for 
this purpose. In return, the agregado provided his labor, and that of 
his family, for the cultivation and maintenance of the hacienda. During 
the 19th century the power of the hacendado was buttressed by a system 
^Central Juanita, San Juan, P.R. Discussion with mill engineer. 
Private communication. 1961. 
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of quasi-forced labor. All non-property owners were required to carry a 
passbook containing certification of their employment status. Unemploy­
ment was a crime, and agitation on a job could result in an unfavorable 
passbook entry to the detriment of the worker (5, pp. 544-546; 20, p. 59). 
As population grew, and the last remaining lands in the interior were 
taken up, the necessity for forced labor vanished. The growing popula­
tion and limited employment opportunities allowed natural forces to 
supplant legal sanctions in the maintenance of the active labor force. 
The system of family haciendas was, with a few exceptions, unable 
to cope with the demands of the new technology of sugar production. His­
torically, the hacienda had been concerned with the maintenance of a 
social order rather than the accumulation and investment of capital 
(38, p. 345). Following the turn of the century a rapid process of 
attrition set in. Growers sold out to continental sugar firms in large 
numbers, or became dependent on the new large mills to have their cane 
ground. There were a few cases, such as Central Cambalache Inc., vHiere-
in local growers were able, either on their own, or in combination, to 
generate sufficient capital to prosper under the new conditions. On 
the whole, however, the sugar industry in the 20's and 30's reflected a 
combination of capitalist large scale plantations grafted on to the 
previous neo-feudal structure. The earlier face-to-face, paternalistic, 
hacendado-agregado relationship was replaced by the impersonal corporate 
organization that dominated all levels of the society (38, pp. 347-351), 
A number of writers have described this domination, and its implications 
for the economy and people of Puerto Rico (5, pp. 611-647; 4, pp. 19-28; 
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10; 15, pp. 5-7; 20, passim; 25; 38, pp. 374-351; 38, pp. 276-278). 
Suffice it to say, the industry's influence was felt throughout all 
sectors and levels of Puerto Rican society. The political process was 
distorted, or more accurately, became a reflection of the desires of the 
industry. The agregado was unable to freely exercise his franchise as 
this could, and did, result in the loss of both his job and home (38, 
p. 39). Labor union organization was fought, and in cases v^ere a union 
could gain sufficient support to mount a strike the power of the local 
courts and police were employed in breaking the strike (24, pp. 85-88). 
There is evidence that wage rates in the industry were affected by this 
monopsony power. Wages were flexible but did not respond to changes in 
the price of sugar. The relationship is as follows: 
W » 71.07 + 0.43 P r = 0.665** 
Where W • index of wages 1913 - 1932 and P » index of prices 
1913-1932 (4, p. 124) 
The elasticity of wages with respect to prices was 0.43, i.e., a one 
percent rise in prices would result in a rise in wages of less than 
one-half of one percent. Leaving out 1920 and 1921, years of abnormal­
ly high prices and wages, the relationship between wages and prices 
would be: 
W - 111.22 + 0.09 P r - 0.192^^ 
with an elasticity of wages with respect to price of .09. Deleting the 
years 1920 and 1921, the trend in wages is as follows; 
W - 103.13 + 1.91 T r » 0.643** 
giving an annual rate of increase of one and one-half percent. With 
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1920 and 1921 included, the trend in wages is: 
W - 122.98 + 1.15 T r = 0.168^^ 
^ere the time coefficient is not significantly different than zero. The 
trend in prices over the whole period is negative, but this obscures the 
fact that prices rose rapidly from 1915 through 1927, increases that were 
not accompanied by wage increases. 
It has been shown that family expenditures of sugar workers in 1940 
were no more than one-third of the level set by minimum adequate standards 
set by the Works Progress Administration (31, pp. 159-185). Compared with 
the fact that even during the depth of the depression two of the largest 
sugar companies continued to declare dividends (4, p. 129), \rtiile both 
the real and actual income of workers in the industry showed signs of 
declining, and had been declining for some time following an initial in­
crease from 1901 to 1919 and again from 1920 to 1927 (4, pp. 49-50; 124), 
it is no wonder that pressures to "do something" were very strong. A 
series of violent strikes from 1931 to 1933 forced the Association of 
Sugar Producers to sign an industry-wide agreement with the labor unions 
represented by the Federacion Libre (10, pp. 223-225). However much a 
milestone this agreement was, it could do little in the face of rising 
costs, falling sugar prices, and heavy unemployment. 
It was during the early thirties that the United States Government 
began to take something more than a passing interest in its Caribbean 
territory. A committee composed of local and mainland officials issued 
the Chardon Plan, named after the committee chairman, in 1934. The 
plan ". . . envisaged, via the machinery of a semi-public corporation 
. , ,, the enforcement of the 500-Acre Law, rural resettlement. 
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diversification of agriculture, the encouragement of cooperatives, rural 
electrification, rehabilitation of the stagnant coffee and tobacco areas, 
the government purchase of at least one sugar mill be operated as a 
yardstick for regulating future relationships between the colonos (inde­
pendent cane growers) and the millowners, and, finally, the genesis of a 
Puerto Rican industrialization plan through the sponsorship of a local 
cement plant" (20, p. 125), This document became the intellectual cor­
nerstone of the activities of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administra­
tion. 
The PRSA, formed in 1935 by the Federal Government was directed 
toward a rejuvenation of the island's agriculture (9, pp. 163-178), To 
this end, the Central Lafayette sugar company wag purchased and reorgan­
ized as a cooperative. For a number of reasons, some related to the 
cooperative form, but mainly faulty financial arrangements, the agricul­
tural phase of the Lafayette project was not successful. In 1940 the 
land coops were sold to small farmers in plots of 10-140 acres (9, pp. 
168-169; 10, pp. 250-257). A number of other public works type projects 
were instituted along with a program creating family sized subsistence 
farms. Probably of more importance than the actual programs of the agen­
cy was the role the agency played in giving identity to the progressive 
elements within Puerto Rican society. The agency provided a focal point 
for individuals \dio were dissatisfied with previous approaches to Puerto 
Rico's problems. Part of this dissatisfaction rested on the role played 
by political parties up until this time. The key political question 
from 1900 until the thirties had been the status of Puerto Rico vis a vis 
the United States. The dialogue, while dramatic, did little to tackle 
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the concrete day-to-day problems. 
There is little question but that the supporters of the status quo, 
mainly the sugar industry, applauded and fostered this concentration upon 
the status issue (38, pp. 112-115). It was in this atmosphere that the 
Popular Democratic Party was founded in 1938. The party, and its leader 
Munoz Marin, were able to draw on a cadre of young intellectuals who had 
received their training in the PRRA, and crystallize the various dissident 
elements of the society into an effective political power. 
From 1938 until the election of 1940 the Party waged an intensive 
campaign throughout the island stressing the need for reform and con­
crete achievement rather than the sterile debate over status. Pressing 
for land reform, the Party won the support of the vast rural proletariat 
and much of the colono group. The Puerto Rican colono, while generally 
conservative, felt that his position vis-a-vis the sugar processing in­
dustry was such that he was disadvantaged, and lacked bargaining power. 
Discontent with the situation was heightened by the knowledge that the 
large producers were absentee owned,^ and might well have goals incom­
patible with his own welfare. The support given the PDP by labor and 
the colonos coupled with restless groups in other spheres of Puerto Rican 
life enabled them to obtain a tenuous electoral victory in 1940. One of 
the first legislative actions taken by the PDP was passage of the Land 
Law of 1941. The bill was signed by the Governor, Rexford Tugwell, who 
had long advocated extensive reforms for the economy of Puerto Rico. 
^In 1928 approximately two-thirds of the securities of the sugar 
corporations were held outside the island (5, p. 418). 
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The Land Law of 1941 
Passage of the Land Law of 1941 was a belated legislative action 
undertaken to enforce a 500 acre restriction placed on corporate land 
ownership by the Organic Act of 1900. This action of the U. S. Congress 
was undertaken in 1900 to prevent the development of a hi^ly concentra­
ted pattern of land ownership. However, Congress failed to make provi­
sion for penalties or enforcement procedures. The "500 acre law" re­
mained a dead letter until the 1930's when the legislature of Puerto 
Rico passed a series of enabling acts. Quo warranto proceedings were 
instituted under these acts against Rubert Hermanos, Inc. Following a 
series of court tests, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld 
the constitutionality of the "500 acre law" on March 25, 1940. This 
action, in conjunction with subsequent rulings, empowered the Attorney-
General of Puerto Rico to place violators under receivership, thus 
providing the legal basis for creation of the Land Authority and im­
plementation of the new agrarian policy (12). 
The Land Law of Puerto Rico (19), approved on April 12, 1941, 
created the institutional framework by which the people of Puerto Rico 
hoped to bring about a transformation of the island's agrarian struc­
ture. The reform policy of the government, as stated in the preamble 
to the Law, called for the elimination of "corporative latifundia", and 
provision of lands to the agregado^ class. In order to carry out this 
^In the context of this Act, the term agregado referred to the land­
less head of a family whose sole income was derived from wage labor in 
agriculture. His residence must have been established in a house and on 
lands belonging to another person, or his house erected on lands of 
another person. 
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policy, the Law created the Land Authority of Puerto Rico as a public 
corporation with legal existence and granted it wide powers to carry out 
the purposes of the Law. Among these is the power to acquire, by expro­
priation, lands held by any artificial person (corporations, trust, etc.) 
in excess of 500 acres. In addition, the Authority could request the 
Government of Puerto Rico to acquire by purchase, or expropriation, ad­
ditional lands deemed necessary for the program of the Authority. The 
Authority was further empowered to obtain land and property through 
direct purchase. 
As mechanisms for the disposition of lands acquired, three distinct 
activities were assigned to the Authority. These activities are set 
forth in Title IV, V and VI (originally sec. 25) of the Law. 
Under Title IV, the Authority is empowered to lease units of from 
100 to 500 acres of land -- or more where deemed necessary -- to quali­
fied managers for the purpose of establishing proportional profit farms. 
The proportional profit farms were created in order to maintain the ef­
ficiencies felt to be associated with size on the large holdings ac­
quired by the Authority, while providing for a wider distribution of 
the benefits of those holdings. Benefits— net incomes of the farms— 
are distributed to workers in proportion to the amount of wages and 
salaries earned on the farm during the accounting period. Managers 
receive a fixed percentage of the net income. Salaries paid during the 
period are considered to be advances against the final disposition of 
the farm income. These wages are to compare with the regular wage paid 
in the area in which the farm was located. The lessee or manager is not 
individually liable for payment of any obligations attendant upon the 
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lease, but is liable for funds advanced by the Authority for operational 
purposes. The terms "lessee" and "lease contract" used in the Law do 
not carry the full legal meaning as set forth in Puerto Rican law, but 
refer to "administrator" and "administration contract" according to a 
1946 amendment. In effect, the lessee is a manager appointed by the Land 
Authority, According to the Land Law, the Authority functions as the 
fiscal agent for the farms and provides such supervision and resources 
as may be set forth in the contract between the Authority and the lessee. 
Under Title V, lands acquired by the Authority not deemed suitable 
for the cultivation of sugar, and lands expressly acquired for this 
program, are to be distributed in tracts of not less than one-fourth 
1 
of a cuerda and not more than 3 cuerdas to families of agregados who 
wish to own such parcels on which to erect their homes. Later amend­
ments to the Law provided for the distribution of tracts of less than 
one-fourth of a cuerda where this would be deemed desirable. The bene­
fits of the program also were extended to other persons not meeting all 
the conditions set forth in the definition of an agregado. 
Land distributed through this program is to be ceded in usufruct 
to the recipients. The one-fourth cuerda minimum was free, with the 
recipient paying for additional land up to the 3-cuerda maximum in 
yearly installments of not more than $3.00. The terms of the usufruct 
prohibited the usufructuary from alienating or encumbering the property, 
including making improvements or constructing on the property, without 
^Cuerda = 0.9712 acres. 
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the express consent of the Authority. The usufructuary was further ob­
ligated to comply with regulations concerning sanitary matters and pro­
hibited activities. Violation of these regulations could result in 
termination of the usufruct. Provisions were made for the accession of 
heirs to the usufruct in the event of the usufructuary's death. 
Section 25, later amended to Title VI in 1948, provided for the 
creation of individual, or family farms. This section extended the 
program to those areas not directly affected by Titles IV and V. The 
Law authorized the Authority to acquire and distribute land in holdings 
of from 5 to 25 cuerdas (this was later amended to provide for a maximum 
$5,000 valuation rather than an acreage maximum). The farms were to be 
distributed to qualified individuals under contracts of usufruct for 
life. The contracts stipulated a level of semiannual rents to be paid 
to the Authority. The usufructuary agreed to follow such conservation 
and production practices as recommended by the Authority with the excep­
tion that he was free to cultivate such crops as he desired. As with 
Title V, the usufructuary was prohibited from alienating or encumbering 
the holding in any way without the express consent of the Authority, and 
devolution of the usufruct to heirs of the usufructuary was provided for. 
The Land Authority of Puerto Rico 
The Land Authority was created by the Land Law of 1941 as a public 
corporation under the direct control of the Secretary of Agriculture and 
Commerce with a board of directors appointed by the Governor. It was 
initially charged with the operation of Titles IV, V, and VI. However, 
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in 1948, the Social Programs Administration was created within the Land 
Authority for the purpose of administering the Titles V and VI. In 1952 
the Social Programs Administration was separated from the Land Authority 
and given independent status under the Secretary of Agriculture and Com­
merce. The Land Authority was left with control over the Title IV pro­
gram and two sugar mills purchased by the Authority to be operated as 
"yardsticks" for public policy vis-a-vis the sugar milling industry. 
This separated those activities that were of a commercial nature from 
the rural development programs. In addition to its commercial opera­
tions the Authority took on a number of other programs designed to im­
prove and diversify local agriculture. These activities encompassed 
model dairy farms, a pineapple development program, as well as working 
with industrial laboratories on the utilization of sugar by-products 
(37, pp. 64-65). While the proportional profit farm system is the sing­
le biggest operation of the Land Authority, their other activities are 
extensive and wide ranging. 
As of February, 1964, the Land Authority had acquired a total of 
105,286 acres, of which 52,246 acres were in use by the proportional 
profit farm system (Sugarcane Program). Twenty seven thousand and 
twenty-four acres were in use by programs of the Authority with the re­
maining 26,016 acres having been sold or transferred to other governmen­
tal agencies.^ 
The lands leased to the proportional profit farms are organized in 
Hernadez Agosto, Miguel A. Executive Director, Land Authority of 
Puerto Rico. Santurce, P.R. Interview. Private communication. 1964. 
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seven projects located in different parts of the island. Table 25 shows 
the acreage leased to each of the projects in each of the years 1950 
1,2 
through 1962. ' Table 26 presents the average value per acre of lands 
leased to the projects. All of the projects with the exception of Fajar-
do and Guanica are located in the "Humid Alluvial Section of the Northern 
Coastal Lowlands" (29, p. 32). This area is generally one of soils well 
suited to the production of sugar cane. There are, however, pockets of 
poorly drained soils with heavy clays and mucks (29, p. 26), The Toa 
project is located in one of these areas. The Fajardo project is loca­
ted in an area of generally good soils, but one in which drainage prob­
lems can be serious (29, p. 57). Much of the land in the Fajardo pro­
ject is subjected to this drainage problem. The Guanica project on the 
South Coast is located in an area of greater natural productivity than 
any other of the projects (29, p. 112). 
As we will see later, this factor of location plays an important 
part in the operation of the program. In addition to these projects the 
Canos Tiburones project was instituted in 1956. This project is the re­
sult of swamp drainage in the coastal area in the vicinity of Cambalache 
and Plazuela projects. An area of approximately 6,500 acres has been 
drained and prepared for sugar cultivation. Additional lands have been 
transferred from adjacent projects for organizational purposes. This 
1 
Except as noted, all data dealing with the operations of the pro­
portional profit farms have been derived from: Land Authority of Puerto 
Rico. Santurce, P.R. Unpublished reports. Private communication. 1950 
through 1962. 
2 
Tables 25 through 37 will be found in the Appendix. 
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explains some of the decline in land leased to the other seven projects 
in the years following 1956. 
These seven projects are organized into a number of individual pro­
portional profit farms, harvesting anyxAiere from 250 to slightly over 
1,000 acres of sugarcane. The number of farms varied over the 13 year 
period, but averaged 69 farms with an average of 417 acres of cane har­
vested and an average size of 775 acres. Koenig has given a very good 
outline of the organization of the sugar cane program and the relation­
ship between the proportional profit farms and the Land Authority. 
"In the operation of the sugarcane lands on the proportional profit 
farms, officials and employees of the Land Authority are responsible for 
the following services and functions; 1) Field management and super­
vision; 2) production methods and selection of cane varieties; 3) fi­
nancing of land purchased and of crop production as well as collecting 
the proceeds of crops and receiving payments under the Sugar Act; 
4) purchases of fertilizer, equipment, and other items required for 
farm operations; 5) irrigation and drainage; 6) repair of farming equip­
ment; 7) cattle and pastures; 8) labor negotiations and relations; 
9) representation in matters affecting the farm such as legislation and 
hearings; and 10) all records and accounts relating to the farm and its 
operations. Thus the manager of a farm is left largely with the res­
ponsibility for direct supervision of the laborers and the day-to-day 
operations of the place. 
Each proportional-profit farm is required to bear its own operating 
costs, including charges for use of the land, services, depreciation. 
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and interest. Laborers working on such a farm receive as an "advance" 
the regular wage commonly paid in the area, or that may have been fixed 
by Puerto Mean or Federal laws or regulations, or by collective bargain­
ing vTith the laborers. The manager receives a fixed salary. These pay­
ments are included among the operating costs. The net profits of the 
farm are shared. The manager receives a fixed percentage and an amount 
is set aside as a reserve for the farm to take care of future contin­
gencies. The remainder of the net profits is distributed among the farm 
workers in proportions to the days each has worked and to the wages or 
salaries received as an advance for the work performed on the farm. 
Whether or not an individual works on a proportional-profit farm is a 
matter which the worker chooses for himself. All of the laborers on a 
proportional-profit farm are free to join or organize any labor union or 
group without interference." (18, p. 253). 
The statement requires but one qualification. After Koenig had 
published his study the contingency reserve was dropped. This reserve 
had always been opposed by the labor unions on the grounds that this 
1 
money belonged in the net profit "pool" to be divided among the workers . 
With this background of the Land Law of 1941 and its content, we turn to 
the elaboration of an analytical framework. This framework will allow 
us to test the hypotheses developed in the introduction. 
^Colon Torres, Ramon, Former Director, Social Programs Administra­
tion, San Juan, P.R. Interview. Private communication. 1963. 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In examining the proportional profit farm system as a means for 
overcoming the alleged deficiencies of the Puerto Rican economy, it 
would be well to look at the problem from two points of view. We will 
look at the system in light of the situation within the sugar sector, 
and then as a part of the sugar sector as it relates to the economy. 
The framers of the Land Law had in their minds certain ideas concerning 
the role of "big sugar" within the industry. They felt that the industry 
was exercising its extensive powers in maintaining wages at a low level, 
and in blocking any attempts of workers to organize effective labor 
1 
unions. As we have seen, heavy unemployment could not but reinforce 
these efforts. At the same time gains in labor productivity tended to 
further acerbate the situation by lowering the labor requirements. The 
combined impact can be shown by the fact that from 1928 to 1935 the tons 
of cane produced per worker increased by 41 percent, (10, p. 182) while 
the median daily wage fell from $0,958 in 1928 to $0,623 in 1935 (4, 
p. 124). The point of this is that the framers of the Law had implicit 
in their thinking a specific model of the distributional within the 
sugar industry. Stated quite simply, it was that the marginal value 
product of labor was higher than the "artifically low" wage rate, and 
that this explained the profitability of the industry. In point of fact, 
wages seem to have been determined by some subsistence concept such as 
has been discussed by Lewis (21, pp. 403-404). This is borne out by the 
^Acosta Velarde, Jose. o£. cit. 
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prevalance of work sharing in the industry (35, p. 156). However, this 
work sharing did not take the form of adding workers without reducing the 
work-time of other workers. A given number of work hours was divided 
among as many workers as was feasible. Therefore, we have a mixture of 
the rational capitalist manager allocating resources in a society in 
which tradition upholds a maximum employment policy. These points sug­
gest that there was some merit to the position taken by those responsible 
for the Land Law. The proportional profit farm concept may be related 
to this implicit model in the following manner. 
Assume a production function for the sugar industry wherein all 
productive resources, including management, are represented. Further 
assume that the model takes the Cobb-Douglas form, and that the produc­
tive resources may be represented as land, labor, and capital: 
Y . « K"' L"' •='2^ 
0 
Y = gross output 
K = capital 
L = labor 
N = land 
As formulated, the model is homogeneous of degree one, implying constant 
returns to scale. According to Euler's Theorem, if each factor is paid 
its marginal value product the total product would be distributed among 
the factors in the respective proportions a^, and (1-#^ -
(14, pp. 64-66). These conditions would be met if the first order condi­
tions from profit maximization were met. That is to say if the MVP's of 
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factors were equal to their prices. This would yield the distributive 
mode 1; 
BY ÔY BY 
TT = Y - Kp"Lp~Np = Y - —— K ~ —L ~ — N = 0 
&K ÔL ÔN 
where rr = profit 
p = price of the respective resource 
Thus, if profit is positive there is evidence that one or more of the 
factors of production is being paid something less than its MVP. The 
converse also holds. The assumption implicit in the proportional profit 
farm idea was that profits were due to wages being lower than the marginal 
value product of labor. The distributional model implied by the propor­
tional profit farm is as follows: 
TT = Y - Kp-Np- |^(Lp + - p) = 0 
the amount - p)L being the addition to labor's share base on the dif­
ference between the MVP of labor and the wage rate. Actually, this 
model goes further than this and assigns any differences related to 
other factors to labor. Thus, the model may be rewritten as: 
TT = Y-Kp-Np- [hp + -P)L + - P) K + - P) n"! = 0 
^ oij BK ÔN 
This model applies to each individual farm, with the payments Kp, Np, 
and Lp guaranteed. Individual farm losses are covered from the Author­
ity's general fund. The distribution mechanism guarantees to labor an 
amount Lp, where the wage, p, corresponds to the prevailing wage in the 
area. In addition, any profits generated by the MVP's of any factor 
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exceeding their prices, are distributed to labor in proportion to wages 
received. This guarantees that workers on the proportional profit farms 
will not be worse off than workers in the private sector, and to the ex­
tent that profits are present they will be better off. This has implica­
tions for the wage structure throughout the industry. By introducing a 
new distribution mechanism into a large portion of the industry, a de­
gree of competition has been developed. Breaking the monopsonistic 
labor market should have the result of generating a higher degree of 
upward flexibility in all wages in the sugar industry. 
Information on the sugar industry prior to 1940 is not sufficient 
to show whether the distributional model implicit in the Land Law did 
in fact prevail. However, if in comparing the Land Authority's opera­
tions with the private sector between 1950 and 1962 it can be shown 
that they are similar in their factor allocations, we will be able to 
draw some conclusions with regard to the hypotheses formulated earlier. 
If the operations are similar, the MVP's relating to the proportional 
profit farms will allow us to determine whether or not this model ap­
plies to the private sector. This will still not enable us to make any 
firm statements concerning the period prior to 1940. 
The MVP's referred to above will be generated by a production func­
tion analysis of the program. The purpose of this analysis will be to 
test the hypothesis that proportional profit farms were operated in an 
economically efficient manner from 1950 through 1962. The criteria 
will be whether the first order conditions for an optimum allocation 
of resources are met. That is to say are the MVP's of the resources 
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equated to their respective prices (14, pp. 71-75). If these conditions 
do not hold, their relative values will suggest further hypotheses con­
cerning the operation of the system. With reference to the comparison 
of the public and private operations, if it can be determined that the 
two function in a like manner, and if for the public sector all of the 
MVP's except that for labor are equated with their prices, we may then 
examine the validity of the implicit distribution model. Given the 
first two conditions, and if the MVP of labor is higher than its wage 
rate, phis would indicate the presence of monopsonistic elements in the 
labor market. There are no reasons to assume that the sugar industry 
would not allocate its resources along lines suggested by the competitive 
model. This is due to the fact that 1) product prices are not influenced 
by Puerto Rican sugar producers to any extent 2) producers have little 
or no influence over capital costs due to the freedom of movement of 
capital between Puerto Rico and the continental U, S. If monopsonis­
tic elements were present in the labor market, producers would allocate 
resources such that the MVP's of all factors other than labor equaled 
their prices. The difference between the MVP of labor and the wage rate 
would be appropriated as profit. If these conditions are found to hold, 
it would suggest that the distribution model postulated by the framers 
of the Land Law held between 1950 and 1962 and therefore we would assume 
it to have held prior to 1940. 
Moving on from the system itself and its position within the sugar 
industry, we come to the role played the Land Authority as a part of 
the overall economy. The analytical structure designed by Tinbergen for 
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his theory of economic policy provides us with useful tools (39, 40). 
Basic to this approach to economic policy are three distinct elements: 
a welfare function, classification of variables, and the structural 
model (39, pp. 2-5; 40, pp. 1-12). The welfare function represents the 
economic interests of the society translated into quantifiable targets. 
When dealing with a representative government, the policy maker's pref­
erence function serves as a workable proxy for the underlying community 
welfare function. In the case of Puerto Rico we have clearly stated, if 
some^at broad, economic goals of the government. They are: growth in 
per capita income, full employment, and diversification of the economy. 
Formulation of these goals are quantifiable targets may give them a 
flexible or fixed value. Taking growth in per capita income as an ex­
ample, we may formulate the target as some growth rate greater than zero, 
or we may choose some specific rate that is to be achieved. The task is 
to examine the operation and concept of the proportional profit farm 
system within the parameters described by these goals of aggregate 
economic policy. 
Classification of the economic variables is in four distinct parts: 
1) data are exogenous variables over %hich the policy maker has no con­
trol, 2) instrument variables are the class of exogenous variables that 
are subject to direct control, 3) target variables are the endogenous 
quantitative expression of the welfare function, 4) irrelevant variables 
are endogenous to the system but not of primary interest to the policy 
maker. In actuality, the instrument variables are but a sub-grouping 
in the totality of policy means. In addition to the quantitative 
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instrument variables we have the sets of policy means known as struc­
tural changes and reforms. The difference between these three cate­
gories of policy means may be best shown through the proportional profit 
farm system. Possibly the most basic impact of the proportional profit 
farm concept was in the transfer of property rights from one group to 
another. In the Tinbergen schema this is classified as a reform since 
it alters "foundations of the community" (39, p. 3), Given this funda­
mental alteration of ownership, the next stage was a revision in the 
distributive mechanism via the proportional distribution of net profits. 
As an alteration in the modus operandi of the economy, this is classified 
as a structural change. Finally, the ability of the Land Authority to 
alter the input mix and/or the level and kind of output in its holdings 
is an example of the role of the system as an instrument variable. 
With the welfare function specified in terms of target variables, 
and the remaining variables properly classified it remains to specify 
the structural relationships. The model, or set of structural relation­
ships, reflect the technical, behavioral, and institutional patterns 
prevailing in the economy during the period in question. Drawing on 
the available date the parameters of the respective equations are esti­
mated statistically. In cases where valid statistical estimates can­
not be developed a priori assumptions may be made concerning the value 
of the parameters in question. With the completed model we are then in 
a position to determine values of the instrument variables associated 
with predetermined target levels. Conversely, with predetermined in­
strument variables it is possible to solve for the associated target 
levels. 
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Using the Tingergen construct, we are able to integrate the micro 
and macro aspects of the analysis. The structural model provides the 
necessary linkage between the operation of the proportional profit farm 
system and the targets of economic policy. The first step in the inte­
gration process is to derive the reduced form of the model, making the 
target variables functions of only the data and instrument variables. 
With the reduced form of the model we may then examine the relationship 
between the targets and instruments. 
In the case at hand, the model will be formulated with the rate of 
groifth as a single primary target. The level of employment will be 
treated as a secondary target. Output in the public sugar sector and 
net government expenditures are the two policy instruments. Under op­
timum conditions, the public sugar sector will generate an amount equal 
to the land rents that will be available for government expenditure. At 
the same time, the output of the public sugar sector will have an impact 
on the rate of growth through the export mechanism. These relationships 
allow us to study the impact of the Land Authority's operating decisions 
on the overall performance of the economy. By adjusting output levels 
and varying the rules under which profits are distributed, new sets of 
growth and income figures will be derived. These may then be compared 
with the observed figures. For example, if the allocation of variable 
inputs does not satisfy the first order conditions for profit maximiza­
tion, the proper input levels may be applied to the production functions. 
This will yield a new set of output and rent figures. The new rate of 
growth associated with these values may then be compared with the 
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original figure, providing an indication of the influence of the Author­
ity's decision on the performance of the economy. Another test is sug­
gested by the profit distribution mechanism. By varying the rules under 
which profits are distributed, the relationship between profit distribu­
tion and economic growth may be studied. In other words, we may measure 
the cost, in terms of growth, associated with distributing profits to 
labor. 
The following two Chapters will deal with the empirical analysis. 
The first covers the operation of the system and its relationship with 
the private sector. Comparing the public and private sectors will indi­
cate the degree to vAiich their operating goals have differed. The second 
will present the analysis of the impact of the Land Authority on the 
economy through the growth model. The findings of these two Chapters 
will be integrated in the final Chapter in light of the hypotheses stated 
in the Introduction. 
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THE PROPORTIONAL PROFIT FARM SYSTEM 
Operating Efficiency, 1950-1962 
The analysis of the proportional-profit farm system operation 
covers the years 1950 through 1962 and deletes the operation of the Canos 
Tiburones reclamation project. The year 1950 was chosen as the starting 
point because the last major land acquisitions occurred in 1948 with the 
purchase of the Guanica properties. It was felt that by going back be­
fore 1950 the possible dislocations associated with the transfer of own­
ership would have not been representative of the actual operation of the 
system. By the same token, inclusion of the Canos Tiburones project 
would have introduced a bias not reflective of the system, but a func­
tion of the developmental aspect of this project. 
In analyzing the operation of the system the data have been broken 
down by projects, rather than individual farms. An analysis of each 
individual farm operation over time could not have been performed as 
the identity of any single farm has no temporal stability. In addition, 
we are not really interested in developing a detailed farm management 
analysis but in examining the allocation of rather broad resource 
classes. Within each project, there is a certain degree of homogeneity 
as the farms have been distributed among projects on this basis whenever 
possible,^ There is, however, not a great deal of discretion available 
^Hermandex Agosto, Miguel A. Executive Director, Land Authority of 
Puerto Rico. Santurce, P.R. Interview. Private communication. 1963. 
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in this allocation process due to the dispersed nature of the projects. 
It will be shown that there is quite a range of heterogeneity between 
projects. Tlie problem is not serious, since the management input, coming 
mainly from the Authority as it does, is homogeneous as between both 
farms and projects. Again, as we will see below, there are very clear-
cut differences between the projects. Table 27 presents the net profits 
earned by the proportional-profit farms during the period 1950 through 
1962. We see that the total $6,149,251.64 of net profits are distributed 
quite unevenly ranging from $42,954.49 for the Fajardo project to 
$2,687,911.64 for the Guanica project. Two projects, San Vincente and 
Guanica, account for 66 percent of the total net profits. In Table 28 
we find the losses incurred by the farms for the same period. Like the 
net profit picture, losses are unevenly distributed among the projects. 
Three projects, Loiza, Fajardo, and Toa, account for 78 percent of the 
total $12,121,730.94 losses. The seeming paradox of a project register­
ing both net profits and losses in the same year is explained by the 
fact that the farms making up the project are the basic accounting units 
with profits and losses measured at the farm level. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the ratio of profits to the wage bill by project 
and by year. The ratio varies substantially between projects with an 
overall ratio of 0.13. Over the period 1950 to 1962, the ratio exhibits 
an erratic but downward trend. In Tables 4 and 5 we find the ratio of 
losses to gross farm income presented in the same manner. As in Table 2, 
the ratio of losses to income varies between projects. As would be 
expected. Table 5 shows an increase in the ratio over time. 
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The losses incurred by the farms are covered from the general fund 
of the Land Authority into x^ich land rentals are paid. Land rents are 
set at a level that will cover the cost of land and interest thereon, 
amortized over a forty year period. The annual rental figure is set by 
the Authority at 5 percent of the acquisition cost.^ In Table 6, the 
net rents paid are computed from the losses and rents due. Net rents 
being rents due minus losses. We see that projects Fajardo and Toa have 
negative net figures. For the system as a whole from 1950 through 1962 
net rents paid are negative. The significance of this is that during 
the period in question, no payments to land have been paid. There has 
been a subsidy over and above rents foregone of $37,460.81 paid to the 
seven proportional-profit farm projects from the general fund. There is 
no way to determine the exact source of this subsidy as moneys going 
into the general fund lose their identity. All that can be said is 
that the Government has foregone $12,084,270,13 in income on land, and 
paid a subsidy of $37,460.81 in order to maintain the proportional-
profit farm system. The implications of this will be explored more 
fully in Chapter VII. 
Tables 29 through 33 cover the basic information concerning the 
operation of the proportional-profit farm system. The gross income 
figures in Table 29 show that three of the projects; Fajardo, Toa, and 
Guanica differ substantially from the average figure. The pattern for 
the system over the period has been one of rising costs and fluctuating 
gross income per acre. Labor's share of the gross income has remained 
Fernandez Agosto. 0£. cit. 
Table 2. Ratio of profits to wage bill for the period 1950-62 by project 
Project Wage bill Profits Profits/wage bill 
Loiza 6,963,633.48 470,919.27 .068 
Fajardo 9,669,267.17 42,954.49 .004 
Plazuela 4,415,333.42 652,455.22 .148 
Cambalache 6,078,766.29 708,749.17 .117 
San Vincente 6,083,138.92 1,386,466.96 .228 
Toa 6,104,410.64 199,794.89 .033 
Guanica 8,486,108.94 2,687,911.64 .317 
TOTAL 47,800,658.86 6,149,251.64 .130 
Table 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Ratio of profits to wage bill by year 
Wage bill Profits Profits/wage bill 
4,425,770.18 
4,192,740.55 
4,442,320.73 
4,682,907.43 
4,422,806.35 
3,887,613.50 
3.267.310.40 
3,535,668.12 
2,926,507.42 
2,905,671.76 
3,123,806.26 
2,805,452.71 
2.956.394.41 
950,627.97 
1,213,403.65 
694,928.85 
308,968.48 
392,773.64 
552.803.08 
618,981.18 
353.334.09 
54,220.63 
256.008.60 
105.310.61 
402,161.50 
245,729.36 
.215 
.289 
.156 
. 066 
,089 
.142 
.189 
.100 
.019 
.088 
.034 
.143 
.083 
ê 
Table 4. Ratio of losses to income for the period of 1950-62 by project 
Project Income Losses Losses/income 
Loiza 
Fajardo 
Plazuela 
Cambalache 
San Vincente 
Toa 
Guanica 
16.355.263.32 
19,691,805.80 
11,300,372.60 
15,659,382.52 
15.133.491.33 
13,025,825.25 
25,324,281.08 
1,567,025.37 
5,156,228.12 
806,141.97 
609,153.57 
902,434.27 
2,715,590.20 
365,157.44 
.096 
.262 
.071 
.039 
.060 
.209 
.014 
TOTAL 116,490,421.90 12,121,730,94 ,104 
Table 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Ratio of losses to income by year 
Income Losses Losses/income 
10,946,803.20 351,283.37 .032 
10,972,382.40 492,986.93 .045 
11,337,756,95 418,418.65 .037 
9,503,521.16 1,589,494.76 .167 
9,657,066.65 975,698.66 .101 
9,759,430.38 639,635.56 .066 
8,739,565.74 573,819.71 .066 
7,827,942.00 1,075,164.30 .137 
6,695,503.50 1,320,747.02 .197 
7,953,680.68 1,275,771.36 .160 
7,153,397.16 1,206,532.08 .169 
8,444,162.32 1,021,266.18 .121 
7,363,651.11 1,180,911.87 .160 
I 
Table 6. Net rents paid by project 
Project Losses Rents due Net rents paid 
Loiza 
Fajardo 
Plazuela 
Cambalache 
San Vincente 
Tea 
Guanica 
1,567,125.37 
5,156,228.12 
806,141.97 
609,153.57 
902,434.27 
2,715,590.20 
365,157.44 
1,761,605.56 
1,966,534.68 
1,110,192.85 
1,668,871.02 
1,350,070.33 
1,187,054.72 
3,039,940.97 
194,580.19 
•3,189,693.44 
304,050.88 
1,059,717.45 
447,636.06 
•1,528,535.48 
2,674,783.53 
00 
TOTAL 12,121,730.94 12,084,270.13 •37,480.81 
I 
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fairly constant, at about 40 percent. There have been year to year fluc­
tuations, but no secular trend is evident. %ile labor productivity, as 
measured by man days of labor per acre in Table 32 has been going up, 
wages have been going up also as is shown in Table 34. 
The average acreage harvested has gone down in all projects over 
the period. In Table 33 we see that the total has gone down from 34,765 
acres in 1950 to 22,369 acres in 1962. But most of the decline after 
1956 is due to land being transferred to the Canos Tiburones project. 
This does not fully explain the decline however. It seems that over the 
period covered, the Authority has pursued a policy of retrenchment. 
Going to Table 26, the average value per acre of lands leased to the 
proportional-profit farm system has been steadily increasing from $200.46 
per acre in 1950 to $249.25 per acre in 1962. Quite clearly the Authori­
ty has been upgrading the land leased to the sugar cane operation by 
transferring lands to other uses, other agencies, or through direct 
sales. Table 35 shows the average rental payments per acre harvested. 
Returning to labor productivity, Table 7 presents the relationship 
between wages and labor productivity. In this instance labor productivi­
ty is measured in terms of hundred weights of raw sugar produced per 
man day of labor. For the system as a vdiole, the growth in labor produc­
tivity has been approximately the same as the growth in wages, and the 
two highly correlated. The elasticities represent the percent change in 
wages associated with a one percent change in productivity. For the 
system, a one percent change in productivity was associated with a .834 
percent increase in wages. An examination of the wage patterns by 
Table 7. Relationship between wages and labor productivity 
Project 
Correlation coef­
ficient between 
wages and labor 
productivity^ 
Elasticity of 
wages to 
productivity 
changes 
Average annual 
percent change 
in wages 
Average annual 
percent changes 
in labor 
productivity 
Loiza .818** .584 .037 .048 
Fajardo .850** .660 .040 .042 
Plazuela .729** .742 .034 .028 
Cambalache .617* .812 .023 .014 
San Vincente .263 .240 .021 .003 
Toa .883** .637 .048 .061 
Guanica .940** .889 .046 .044 
TOTAL .858** .834 .035 .036 
^Significance level: * = 5 percent, ** = 1 percent. 
46 
project shows no consistent pattern other than that of growth. The rela­
tive rates of growth cannot be explained by any quantifiable factors as­
sociated with the system, other than productivity changes. It seems 
that wages are largely determined by factors outside the system, such 
as local labor supply and pressure for alternative opportunities. One 
factor that may explain the average differences between projects is 
based on the derivation of the wage rate. The rate given here is a 
composite rate made up of the various wage rates prevailing at the time. 
Since wages for different jobs vary, the proportion of workers holding 
different jobs will be important in determining the composite wage. 
Thus, if a project requires a higher proportional input of skilled 
workers, e.g., tractor drivers and irrigation specialists, the composite 
wage will be higher for that project. There is not, however, sufficient 
information available to analyze this situation. 
In Tables 36 and 37 are found listings of average yields of sugar 
cane and raw sugar per acre respectively. The trend in sugar cane per 
acre for the system is: 
C = 31.459 + 0.143 t r = 0.597* 
where C = tons of sugar cane per acre 
and t = index of time 
In contrast, tht; trend in raw sugar for the system is: 
S = 3.613 - 0.029 t r = 0.356^^ 
where S = tons of raw sugar per acre 
and t * time index 
Thus, while tons of sugar cane per acre was increasing, the tons of 
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raw sugar per acre exhibited a downward but statistically insignificant 
trend. In other words, the percentage of sugar retrieved has been de­
clining over the period. This is consistent with a secular pattern 
that has been observed for the industry as a whole. This trend has yet 
to be explained, but seems to be related to secular changes in weather 
patterns in the Caribbean area, and an increasing incidence of a tight 
labor market during the critical harvest period. An examination of 
the relationship between quantifiable variables entering into the 
production process and the output of raw sugar per acre failed to in­
dicate any consistent or significant relationship. Given the cane 
standing in the field, the key factors explaining the yield of sugar 
are available moisture at harvest time, the time of cutting, and the 
2 
period that elapses between cutting and grinding. With the excep­
tion of the Guanica project which is irrigated the other projects rely 
heavily on atmospheric or natural water supplies. If the harvest sea­
son is abnormally wet there will be a heavier production of green mat­
ter rather than sucrose. With respect to the time of cutting and the 
waiting period between cutting and grinding, this is of necessity a 
3 
compromise between the needs of the mill and those of the farm. 
In terms of the operation of the farms, these facts are of signifi­
cance. Correlating the ratio of losses to income and tons of sugar per 
^Capo, B. 6. Associate Director for Research. Agricultural Ex­
periment Station, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, P.R, Inter­
view. Private communication. 1963. 
^Ibid. 
3 
Hernandez Agosto, o^. cit. 
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for the projects yields a correlation coefficient of 0.882 which is 
significant at the one percent level. With management equal between 
projects this would indicate that the profitability of any one project 
vis-a-vis another is conditioned largely by factors external to the 
firm. 
Tables 8 through 11 present the results of a production function 
analysis, by project, for the system. The variables included are: 
Y = gross farm income 
X = total non-land expenditures 
K = capital expenditures 
L = man days of labor 
N = land in acres 
t = time index 
The models fitted were of the Cobb-Douglas form as follows: 
For each project over time. 
GhG)" 
and 
Transforming these from a per acre basis to a project basis we get: 
For each project. , _Q, 
Y = «0 ^  ^  
Y = So K®1 
Table 8. Production functions incorporating capital, labor, and time, with land imputed 
Project Capital Labor Land Time 
Loiza .0211 
(.1003) 
.3828 
(.0837) 
.5961 
(.1205) 
.1090 
(.0071) 
.161 
Fajardo .4859 
(.1050) 
.3723 
(.1083) 
.1418 
(.1092) 
-.0015 
(.0089) 
.436 
Plazuela .2837 
(.0943) 
.5373 
(.1182) 
.1790 
(.0997) 
.0096 
(.0077) 
.460 
Cambalache .4569 
(.0798) 
.4402 
(.0822) 
.1029 
(.0803) 
.0000 .676 
San Vincente .4881 
(.0945) 
.3204 
(.0851) 
.1915 
(.1006) 
-.0251 
(.0073) 
.448 
Toa .1739 
(.1030) 
.3126 
(.0849) 
.5045 
(.0927) 
.0123 
(.0100) 
.171 
Guanica .7364 
(.0929) 
.1680 
(.1090) 
.0956 
(.0989) 
-.0052 
(.0073) 
.498 
Table 9, Marginal value products of capital, labor, and land 
Project KL N 
Loiza .038 3.486 189.220 
Fajardo .716 2.749 37.970 
Plazuela .517 4.827 56.843 
Cambalache .909 4.014 32.008 
San Vincente 1.004 2.798 57.674 
Toa .270 2.355 134.676 
Guanica 1.620 1.920 38.593 
Table 10, Production functions incorporating non-land expenditures and time, with land imputed 
Project Non-land expenditures Land Time 
Loiza .3374 .6626 -.0063 .086 
(.0989) (.0989) (.0032) 
Fajardo .7961 .2039 -.0200 .415 
(.0755) (.0755) (.0035) 
Plazuela .6438 .3562 -.0094 .401 
(.0813) (.0812) (.0055) 
Cambalache .7856 .2144 -.0130 ,649 
(.0535) (.0535) (.0027) 
San Vincente .7376 .2624 -.0309 .444 
(.0954) (.0954) (.0037) 
Toa .5585 .4415 -.0136 .211 
(.1028) (.1028) (.0045) 
Guanica .8856 .1144 -.0125 .574 
(.0675) (.0675) (.0029) 
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Table 11. Marginal value products for non-land expenditures and land 
Project X N 
Loiza .344 210.329 
Fajardo .681 52.559 
Plazuela .686 113.115 
Cambalache .882 66.691 
San Vincente .831 79.027 
Toa .502 117.858 
Guanica 1.122 46.182 
The assumption is that constant returns to scale prevail in the system, 
i.e., the sum of the coefficients of the productive variables equals 
one. At the project level this is a reasonable assumption since the 
projects are faced with no serious discontinuities in their inputs. As 
was stated above, the Authority maintains capital inputs and rents them 
to the projects; therefore they are close to infinitely variable to the 
projects. Labor also is highly variable as the standard practice is to 
hire workers by the day. Since the projects purchase their managerial 
services from the Authority they are included in the capital figure. 
A number of other models were tried with capital broken down into 
its various component parts, i.e., machinery, fertilizer, etc. These 
were found to yield very unreliable coefficients due to the high degree 
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of culticollinearity present relative to the overall correlation (16, 
pp. 201-207; 13, pp. 134-136). Cross-sectional functions fitted annual­
ly for all seven projects combined were rejected due to the diverse 
conditions prevailing among the projects. 
The coefficients for the capital, labor, and time models fitted by 
projects are found in Table 8. They are listed along with their vari-
2 
ances, the multiple R , and the imputed land coefficient with its vari­
ance. The variance of the land coefficient is determined in the follow­
ing manner: 
b = 1 - b - b = 1 - (b + b ) 
n k 1 k 1 
and since 
Var (1 + b^) = Var (b^) 
then 
Var (b^) = Var (b^ + b^) 
That is to say, the variance of any parameter plus or minus one is equal 
to the variance of the original parameter. Therefore, the variance of 
the land coefficient is equal to the combined variance of the capital 
and labor parameters (13, pp. 116-117). 
The statistical interpretation of these functions varies somevrtiat 
from the standard procedures in that the functions are not meant to 
represent any larger population of sugar producers. The data employed 
in fitting the functions include all of the observations in the popula­
tion, i.e., a single project for the years 1950 through 1961. Addition­
ally, since the observations can not be replicated, the statistical 
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universe has been exhausted as well. Thus, the normal tests of signifi­
cance are of limited interest in the present case. However, the varian­
ces are of some value to us in indicating- the possible effects of multi-
collinearity on the coefficients. A high degree of multicollinearity, 
i.e., strong correlation between the independent variable relative to 
the overall correlation, leads to indeterminant values for the coeffi­
cients (13, pp. 134-136; 16, pp. 204-206). Abnormally high variances 
would be an indication that multicollinearity was a serious problem 
(16, p. 206), However, looking at Table 8, we see that none of the 
variances stand out as being substantially different from their counter­
parts. This holds as well for the functions exhibited in Table 10, 
Before accepting these functions, the question of autocorrelation 
must be examined. On the basis of the von Neumann ratio test (13, pp, 
131-132) it was found that the independent variables were autocorrela-
ted, i.e., successive elements in the time series were correlated. This, 
however, would only affect the reliability of the tests of significance 
which we have seen are not important here. It was found that the de­
pendent variable, gross income per acre, was not autocorrelated. The 
Durbin-Watson test indicated that there was no evidence of autocorrela­
tion in the errors, or residuals. The absence of autocorrelated errors 
indicates that; the model is algebraically satisfactory, there were no 
errors of observation, and no important explanatory variables have been 
omitted (16, p. 133). Since no important explanatory variables have 
been left out the low R^'s indicate the importance of exogenous stochastic 
influences on the production process. Thus, we may accept the results 
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shown in Tables 8 and 10 as being the most reasonable representations of 
the production coefficients. 
The economic interpretation of the functions is based on the mar­
ginal value products and imputed returns to land presented in Tables 9 
and 11. Comparing these values with their prices, i.e., $1.05 for capi­
tal, the wage rate for labor, and rents due for land, it is immediately 
clear that a substantial divergence exists between the allocation of re­
sources and the functional distribution of the total product. This di­
vergence may be seen more clearly in Table 12 which presents the ratios 
of MVP's to prices taken from the figures of Table 9. 
Table 12. Ratios of marginal value products to prices 
Capital Labor Land 
Loiza .036 .958 5.534 
Fajardo .682 .770 1.420 
Plazuela .492 1.375 1.822 
Cambalache .866 1.134 .965 
San Vincente .956 .797 2.146 
Toa .257 .667 5.535 
Guanica 1.543 .501 .796 
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The ratios from Table 12 pertaining to land are indicative of the 
general allocation of resources during the period in question. Otr*five 
of the projects, Loiza, Fajardo, Flazuela, San Vincente, and Toa, the 
combined inputs of capital and labor have been applied at a level greater 
than that which would optimize the allocation of resources. In other 
words, ratios of marginal value products to prices greater than one for 
land implies that the first order conditions for profit maximization 
could be achieved by applying lesser quantities of capital and labor to 
an acre of land. The Guanica project displays the converse, i.e., a 
more intensive application of capital and labor would move the project 
in the direction of profit maximization. The Cambalache project, with a 
ratio of 0.965 seems to be fairly close to an optimum allocation of re­
sources. The functions employing non-land expenditures as the independ­
ent variable are fully consistent with these conclusions with the excep­
tion that they tend to overstate the imputed returns to land. Based on 
the marginal value products of Table 12, all of the projects, with the 
exception of Guanica, display decreasing marginal returns. The Guanica 
project remains in the area of increasing marginal returns to the vari­
able factors. In Table 13 the combined marginal return to cost ratios 
are compared with the average net income per acre, assuming no profit 
distribution. The ratios for capital and labor have been combined in 
the same proportions that prevail in the non-land expenditure figure. 
The net income figure is computed by subtracting the average non-land 
expenditures and rents per acre from the average gross income figure. 
Since the sugar producers are selling in a market having many 
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Table 13. Combined marginal value product to price ratios, and average 
net income per acre, assuming no profit distribution 
Ratios Net income 
Loiza .442 -27.48 
Fajardo .719 -72.00 
Plazuela .863 -11.70 
Cambalache .984 .89 
San Vincente .885 6.90 
Toa .429 -54.71 
Guanica 1.114 36.56 
characteristics of the competitive model and payment to all factors of 
production is included in the production function, we would expect that 
at a marginal value product to price ratio of one, the net profits per 
acre would be zero. In fact, the correlation coefficient between these 
two sets of figures is 0.763 (significant at the 0.05 level) with an 
estimated ratio of 0.937 at zero net income. The relationship does not 
hold exactly in Table 13, but is generally consistent with the relation­
ship that would be postulated in theory. What discrepancies are present 
can be explained in terms of the different intertemporal distributions 
of losses and income prevailing in each project. With one production 
functions being fit over time, there is a smoothing effect that masks 
these patterns. Looking back at Tables 27 and 28 it is clear that 
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different projects display different performance trends as measured by 
losses and net profit or income. 
These results provide the key to explaining the performance of the 
proportional-profit farm system. Part of the increase in losses and de­
crease in profits is due to the industry-wide pattern of fairly stable 
income per acre coupled with rising costs.^ The most important factor, 
however, is that the proportional-profit farm system is pursuing two 
policy goals which are inconsistent with their original goal of maintain­
ing production efficiency. They are pursuing the goals of maximizing 
output and employment on the lands under their control. This conclusion 
is based first on the results shown in Tables 8 through 13 and second 
2 
by discussions with officials of the Land Authority. That goal of the 
organization is maximum cane production per acre is borne out by the 
following equation: 
S = -15.55 + 0.3410X -O.OOOôX^ = .52 
(.1029) (.00021) 
where S = tons of cane per acre 
X = non-land expenditures per acre 
The equation was estimated over all projects for all years. The coef­
ficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Setting the derivative 
of S with respect to X equal to zero, and solving for X, yields a maxi­
mum for S at an input of $284.17 of X, This corresponds with the 
^This matter will be explored more fully in the next chapter. 
Fernandez Agosto, o£, cit. 
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observed average value of X of $297.45. S shows a maximum of 32.90 tons 
of cane per acre with an observed value of 32.54 tons per acre. Projects 
such as Fajardo and Toa have been kept in operation while sustaining ex­
treme ly high losses, and production on other projects has been pushed to 
the point where losses have exceeded profits on the average. Since 
these policies are applicable to all seven projects, the profitability 
of Guanica, San Vincente, and Cambalache is more than likely due to ex­
ogenous factors. There is no evidence to suggest that differential 
policies have been pursued. 
It is clear, that in a period of sustained high unemployment (36, 
p. 469), the Land Authority has substituted an employment stabilizing 
policy for a degree of production efficiency. One further concern 
bearing on this matter is the problem of an unfavorable balance on cur­
rent trade accounts experienced by Puerto Rico during this period (36, 
p. 470). As better than 90 percent of Puerto Rico's sugar is exported, 
any reduction in output would have an unfavorable impact on this bal­
ance, The implications of these policies with respect to the overall 
performance of the economy will be explored in Chapter VI. 
Comparison of Public and Private Operations 
In the preceding chapter it has been shown that there are substan­
tial deviations from the optimum to be found in the operation of the 
Land Authority's sugar program. The point was made that the Authority 
seems to be pursuing a set of goals inconsistent with economic efficien­
cy as represented by the competitive theory of the firm and the stated 
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goals of the Land Law (14, pp. 42-84), The purpose of this chapter is 
to give the preceding work wider relevance by reviewing the Land Auth­
ority's operation within the context of the sugar industry as a whole. 
Data for the industry are very incomplete, therefore comparison will of 
necessity be based upon a very few indices. However limited, these com­
parisons provide the only base on which we can judge the degree to which 
the Land Authority operations have deviated from those of the industry. 
In Tables 14 and 15 are found figures dealing with the yield in 
tons of sugar per acre produced by the public and private sectors. The 
Land Authority figures are compared with the whole private sector in 
Table 14 for the years 1946 through 1960, including averages and rates 
of change. 
Table 15 shows the comparison between the Land Authority and samples 
of producers harvesting one hundred or more acres of cane for the years 
1946 through 1958. These tables indicate that the Authority was able to 
achieve average yields that were higher than the industry, but lower 
than those of the larger producers. In both cases, the annual decline 
experienced by the Authority was greater than either the industry or the 
larger producers. These figures should be viewed carefully, as they are 
dependent upon a number of factors, e.g., location, microclimate, and 
^All of the data presented here and subsequently referring to private 
producers harvesting more than one hundred acres of cane have been drawn 
from: U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service. Sugar Division. Unpublished studies of returns, 
costs and profits in the Puerto Rican sugar industry. Private communica­
tion. Washington, D.C. 1956, 1961. 
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Table 14. Yield in tons of sugar per acre: 1946-1961 
Land authority Industry^ 
Average 3.56 3.23 
Average percent change - .016 - .009 
Correlation coefficient - .686** ,505* 
^Source (42, p. 34), adjusted to remove Land Authority component. 
Table 15. Yield in tons of sugar per acre: 1946-1958 
Private producers 
harvesting ICQ 
Land authority acres or more 
Average 3.60 3,73 
Average percent change - .023 - .009 
Correlation coefficient - .761** - .519^^ 
regional variations in labor supply during the harvest season, over which 
management has no control. 
Correlating the ratio of losses to income (assuming no profit dis­
tribution on the proportional profit farms) with average yield in tons 
of sugar for the years 1951 through 1958 provides some illuminating re­
sults. The regression coefficients for the Land Authority and the 
producers harvesting more than one hundred acres of cane were -.208 and 
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-.229 respectively, with correlation coefficients of -.885** and -.884**. 
The regression coefficients were found not to be statistically different. 
These figures make it clear that, no matter what differences may have 
existed between the Authority and the larger producers in terms of the 
overall level of yields, their ability to respond to annual variations in 
yield was the same. 
Tables 16 and 17 present comparisons between wage rates and labor 
productivity. Wage rates are per day, and labor productivity is measured 
in hundredweights of sugar produced per man day. Table 16 compares the 
Authority with the industry for the years 1950 through 1961, and Table 17 
compares the Authority with producers harvesting one hundred acres of 
cane or more for the years 1951 through 1958. 
Clearly, the average daily wage paid on the proportional profit 
farms has been higher than that paid on either category of the private 
farms. The wage has also been rising at a faster rate during the 
periods in question. The rates of change in both wages and productivity 
in Tables 16 and 17 for the private sector are derived from time regres­
sions whose difference from their public counterparts is statistically 
significant. Thus, while public wages have been higher and increasing 
faster, labor productivity has also been higher and increasing faster 
in the public xector. No doubt, the public-private differential in wage 
rates is partly due to the heightened sensitivity of the Land Authority 
to labor union pressures (35, pp. 143-145). Given this fact, the 
Authority has been able to adjust its labor productivity in a pattern 
comparable to the changes in wages, while labor productivity in the 
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Table 16. Wages and labor productivity: 1950-1961 
Land Authority Industry* 
Average daily wage 3.70 3.58 
Average labor productivity 2.00 1.64 
Average percent change in 
daily wage^ .035** .034** 
Average percent change in^ 
labor productivity .036** .025** 
^Source (42, pp. 34-35) adjusted to remove Land Authority component. 
^The asterisks refer to the significance of the regression with 
respect to time. 
Table 17. Wages and labor productivity; 1951-1958 
Land Authority 
Private producers 
harvesting 100 
acres or more 
Average daily wage 3.86 3.51 
Average labor productivity 1.73 1.53 
Average percent change in^ 
daily wage .071** ,039** 
Average percent change in 
labor productivity* .069** .024** 
®The asterisks refer to the significance of the regressions with 
respect to time. 
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private sector has not risen as rapidly as the wage rate. It should be 
noted however that while the public sector has adjusted labor productivi­
ty more effectively, the net result still shows a higher total labor cost 
in the public sector. 
With respect to the total cost of producing a hundredweight of 
sugar, comparisons can be made between the Land Authority and those 
producers harvesting one hundred or more acres of cane. For the period 
from 1951 through 1958, the Authority produced sugar at an average cost 
of $4.38 per hundredweight as compared with $4,02 for the larger private 
producers. During the same period, public costs rose at a rate of 2.1 
percent per year while the costs of the larger private growers rose by 
3.2 percent per year. These findings are consistent with the results 
shown in Table 28. 
Table 18 brings us to a comparison of production functions for the 
public and private sectors. The private sector is represented by two 
functions fitted to different samples for different periods, A func­
tion for producers harvesting more than one hundred acres of cane 
covers the period 1951 through 1958. For the years 1957, 1960 and 
1962, a function has been fitted to a sample of producers harvesting 
more than five acres of cane. A function for the public sector, with 
all projects combined, covers the period from 1950 through 1962. The 
functions employ non-land expenditures per acre and time as the inde­
pendent variables, with gross income per acre the dependent variable. 
The Cobb-Douglas form was used, with time entering in a linear form, i.e.. 
Table 18. Comparison of public and private production functions 
Land 
Authority 
1950-1962 
Private producers 
harvesting 100 
acres or more: 
1951-1958 
Private producers 
harvesting 5 
acres or more: 
1957, 1960, 1962* 
Coefficients : 
Non-land expenditures .692% 
(.081|> 
.9952 
(.2648) 
.8758 
(.1368) 
Land (imputed) .307# 
(.0813b 
.0048 
(.2648) 
.1242 
(.1368) 
Time -.0155 
(.0036) 
- - -
- - -
.403 .414 .707 
Average gross income per acre 311.630 345.143 308.327 
Average non-land expenditures per acre 297.450 318.667 256.633 
MVP for non-land expenditures .725 1.078 1.017 
MVP for land 95.951 1.657 38,294 
Land cost per acre 33.290 25.541 26.250 
Average net profit per acre -19.110^ .935 16.444 
^Source of data (8). 
^Assuming no distribution of net profits. 
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It is quite clear from these results that the operations of the 
Land Authority have differed from those of the private sector. The 
marginal value products of non-land expenditures for the two private 
sector samples are approximately equal to their opportunity costs of 
1.05. The figure of 0.725 for the public sector is fully consistent 
with the findings of Chapter IV. Thus, these findings support the hy­
pothesis that the private sector is pursuing profit maximization as a 
goal in contrast to the output maximization goal being pursued by the 
Land Authority. The differences exhibited between the public and private 
operations prevent the drawing of any conclusion concerning the presence 
of monopsony power in the private sector of the labor market. The com­
parative findings, while of some interest, have limited value in ap­
praising the operations of the Authority. The importance of factors 
such as location, soil type and drainage problems calls for a far more 
detailed analysis than could be undertaken with the available data. 
However, given the divergence in goals as shown in Table 29, there are 
certain points that develop from this analysis. The Authority has shown 
a greater ability to increase labor productivity as wages have risen 
than has the industry as a whole, or the larger producers. On the aver­
age the Authority has paid higher wages than either the industry, or 
the larger producers. Finally, the Authority has been able to control 
rising costs better than the larger producers. It should be noted that 
the higher unit cost exhibited by the Authority is not conclusive 
evidence that public sugar is inherently more costly to produce than 
private sugar. A judgment of this nature could only be made on the 
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basis of a comparison between public and private operations located in 
like areas and producing under like conditions. Information of this 
nature is not available. 
Of far more interest than the comparison between the public and 
private operations would be a comparison between the operations of in­
dividual units before and after public acquisition. Unfortunately, this 
comparison can be made with respect to only one project, the Cambalache 
project. Packard's 1948 .study provides a fairly detailed analysis of 
the changes that took place on the Cambalache project following acquisi­
tion in 1943 (27, pp. 73-80). Packard shows conclusively that public 
operation of the lands in the Cambalache project was of a beneficial 
nature. Sugar yields on the project during the period 1944-46 were 
higher relative to the island average than were yields during the 1939-
41 period. By 1947, the area planted to sugar cane had increased from 
3,777.5 acres to 5,109.6 acres or 35.26 percent. In addition, non-cane 
lands were put to more productive and/or socially useful purposes. One 
thousand ninety-six acres of lAiat was previously pasture land was sub­
divided into family farms under Section 25 (later Title IV) of the Land 
Law. One thousand five hundred fifty-five acres were distributed to 
agregados under Title V of the Land Law. Five hundred and forty-one 
acres of former wasteland was transferred to the Insular Forest Service 
and placed under a program of J'improved forest management" (27, p. 77). 
The Cambalache project was made up of the initial land acquisitions 
of the Land Authority. It is possible that an extra effort was made to 
insure the success of the project, or that the initial acquisitions were 
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carefully chosen in such a way that success of this type would be virtual­
ly assured. Action of this nature would have been undertaken in order to 
quiet the critics of the program. It is impossible, based on the inform­
ation available, to make a judgment about this one way or the other. By 
the same token, there is no way in which we can determine whether or not 
the Cambalache project is atypical with respect to the other six projects. 
About all that can be said is that, given the different operational goals, 
there seems to be nothing inherent in the proportional-profit farm system 
that makes it either more or less efficient than a private operation. 
We have viewed the operation of the Land Authority by itself, and 
in comparison with the private sector of the sugar industry. Of con­
cern at this point is the way in which this program is related to the 
total economy. The next chapter will present the findings dealing with 
the multi-equationed model of the Puerto Rican economy. 
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AGGREGATE PROGRAM IMPACT 
The final stage in the quantitative analysis of this program ex­
amines the relationship between the program and the overall performance 
of the Puerto Rican economy. This will be undertaken viewing the pro­
portional profit farm system as a structural change, and as a policy 
instrument. The issue of the reform aspect of the program will be taken 
up in the final section of this report. Following the outline of the 
Tinbergen framework discussed previously, the task will require the 
specification of the underlying structural relationships of the economy. 
To this end, a multi-equation linear model has been constructed wherein 
the output of the public sugar sector is explicitly treated as a policy 
instrument. With the exception of the public sugar sector, the rela­
tionships described are heavily aggregated. This was done in order to 
bring the focus clearly on the operations of the Land Authority. 
1 
The variables employed in the model are as follows: (17, 32) 
= Annual gross output for the economy (mil. $) 
X = Annual gross output of the public sugar sector (mil. $) 
It 
Xzt" Annual gross output of the economy minus the public 
sugar sector (mil. $) 
Annual employment minus the public sugar sector 
(thous. man-years) 
= Annual investment in fixed plant and equipment (mil. $) 
E^ = Annual exports (mil. $) 
^Dollar values are deflated by the relevant indices. 
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= Annual net government expenditures (mil. $) 
W(I)^ =» Index of non-agricultural wages 
= Net accumulated capital stock (mil. $) 
T = Time index; 1-14, years 1948-1961 
AY = - Y - r ; incremental change in gross output (mil. $) 
= AY / Y^; percent change in gross output 
Five equations were estimated for the model, with the level of 
taken from the findings of Chapter IV and deflated by an index of sugar 
prices (42). Output in X was estimated from an equation relating out-
». 
put per man-year to investment per man-year; 
J 
Constant returns to scale were achieved by the following transformation: 
Since the model requires linear equations, the transformed equation was 
linearized through the use of Taylor's Series of the first order (44, 
pp. 171-172), giving: 
X = I + L 
Annual employment, minus employment in the sugar sector, is given by a 
linear equation using investment, the index of non-agricultural wages, 
and time as the independent variables: 
'•at - c) 
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The level of investment is determined by the net accumulated capital 
stock and net government expenditures. Net accumulated capital stock was 
derived by the summation of annual investments minus annual depreciation. 
The capital stock variable was lagged one year. Net government expendi­
tures are total government expenditures minus transfer payments. 
I = I (K G ) 
t t t - 1, t 
Exports are a simple function of gross output with the exception 
that all of the gross output of the public sugar sector is assumed 
exported: 
E '= E '(X ) ; where E ' = E - X, 
t t 2t ' t t It 
The final behavioral equation is the estimation of annual incremen­
tal changes in gross output. The independent variables are lagged gross 
output, exports, and investment: 
«^.1, V 
Two identities close the system: 
Tf - :it + :2t 
and 
R  = 4 Y / Y  
t t 
Table 30 presents the matrix of coefficients for the model. The 
variables have been divided into endogenous variables, data variables, 
and instrument variables. For the purposes of this study all of the 
endogenous variables are irrelevant with the exception of R^, the rate 
Table 19. Matrix of coefficients 
Equation 
number Endogenous variables 
^2t 2t AY 
Date variables 
t - 1 K t - 1 W(I), 
Instrument 
variables 
Gt ^it 
3 
2 
1 
6 
4 
5 
7 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
Ov VO 
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of growth, as the target variable. The level of employment will be 
treated as a secondary target variable. Thus, we have a system in which 
there are two instrument variables available to influence one target 
variable, giving the system one policy degree of freedom (40, pp. 37-38). 
The portion of the matrix representing the endogenous variables is tri­
angular, implying a recursive system. Since this condition holds, it 
is possible to present the target, R^, as a function of data and instru­
ment variables in the reduced form; 
The equations shown above were estimated individually using least 
squares regression techniques. All of the equations are over-identified 
pointing to full-information maximum likelihood as being the most desir­
able technique. However, with a recursive system, we have the special 
case wherein least squares applied to each individual equation is identi­
cal to the full-information maximum likelihood estimation (16, pp. 264-
266, p. 293). The results are shown below with the variances of the co-
2 
efficients, and the multiple R s. 
 ^\ ("t - \ _ 1' \t) 
1) X„ = 3.2771 + .734 L 
2t t 
R^ = .940 
2t 
(.229) (.095) 
2) L = 501.879 - .084 I + 195.723 W(I) R 2 764 
2t t t 
(.055) (95.571) 
... -14.823t 
(5.035) 
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3) I 13.697 + .096 K + .888G = .975 
t (.030) t - 1 (.429)% 
4) E' » -133.464 + .434 X + X R^ = .967 
^ (.022) It 
5) 4Y = 170.360 - .407 Y + .514 E R^ = .774 
^ (.122) t " 1 (.308) t 
+ .730 I 
(.260)-t 
6) Y = X + X 
t It 2t 
7) R^ = Y / Y 
t t 
The reduced form solution for R^ is: 
164.447 - .407 Y + 1.285 G + 32.048 W(I) 
E ï_Li E ï 
^ 324.493 + .310 K + 2.856 G + 143.719 W(I) 
t - 1 t t 
+ .514 X - 2.427 t + .139 K 
It t - 1 
+ 1.000 X^^ - 10.884 t 
For the purpose of estimating R^ in the reduced form the following 
equations were used in deriving values for K and Y : 
t - 1 t - 1 
K = 127.154 + 33.728 t + 6.794 t^ R^ = .999 
^ (6.552) (.397) 
and 
Y = 646.004 + 72.800 t R^ = .980 
t 1 (2.892) 
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This was done since using the mean values, would bias the estimate of 
K and Y upward with respect to the mean values of the other 
t - I t - 1 
variables. Using mean values for W(I)^, G , , and t, with K ^ 
and Y ^ estimated from values of t = 7.5 and t = 6.5 respectively, 
the estimated value of R^, the average rate of growth, was found to be 
.0621, or 6.21 percent per year. This compares favorably with the ob­
served average rate of growth of 6.23 percent per year as estimated by: 
In Y = 6.5840 + .0623 t » .968 
t (.0032) 
Equations 1, 3, and 4 are quite straightforward in their interpreta­
tion. Equation 3 is interesting as it shows the important role of govern­
ment expenditures during the early years of the development process. It 
is only after capital stock has accumulated substantially that it has 
any major impact on the level of investment. As the accumulation process 
continues, this variable becomes more important than government expendi­
tures. Equation 4 points out the importance of exports to the economy, 
with better than 40 percent of gross output being exported. This figure 
has shown a tendency to increase in recent years, increasing the sensi­
tivity of the economy to fluctuations in the economy of the mainland 
(3, pp. 77-78; 36, p. 470). 
The coefficients in equation 2 point up the conflicting forces in­
volved in determining the level of employment. The negative sign on the 
investment coefficient is representative of a substitution of capital of 
labor during this period. This substitution has taken place to some de­
gree in all sectors of the economy. More important, however, has been 
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changing structure of the economy — from a primarily agricultural econ­
omy to an economy of light industry with a fairly large agricultural 
sector (3, p. 78; 36, pp. 463-464). The structure of the labor force 
has changed during the period as shown in Table 20. 
Within sectors, there has been a growth in employment in the higher 
paying categories of skilled employment. This explains the positive 
coefficient associated with the non-agricultural wage index. 
The negative time coefficient, while reflecting in part the effects 
of investment, is more than likely representative of the effects of the 
total population picture. During the period in question, the natural 
rate of population growth has been roughly 2.5 percent per year. Migra­
tion to the mainland has been sufficient to reduce this figure to an 
actual rate of 1.5 percent per year. Out-migration has drawn heavily 
from males in the productive ages, while in-migrants have been largely 
children and retirees. As a result, the percentage of the population 
in the productive ages has been declining and has produced a declining 
participation rate (employment divided by population) (36, pp. 469-
470). 
The combined effects of these influences has been to produce a 
fairly stable level of employment. A decline in employment is noted 
to a low in 1955 with an erratic upward movement following 1955. The 
rate of unemployment has remained high, averaging 13 percent per year. 
This factor of a high rate of unemployment will be of significance to 
the examination of the relationship of the Land Authority's operations 
to the overall pattern of economic development. 
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Table 20. Percentage of employment in major sectors 1950 and 1961* 
1950 1961 
Agriculture .36 .23 
Manufacturing .09 .15 
Services and other .47 .50 
Government .08 .12 
^Source (17, p. A-22). 
The key points to be considered when viewing the Authority in the 
context of the total economy are as follows. With respect to the Authori­
ty we have 1) roughly 10 percent of the sugar industry operated by a 
public agency, 2) two projects of this operation sustaining very high 
losses, 3) the other projects, except one, operating beyond the profit 
maximizing optimum, 4) profit distribution taking place at the same time 
that losses are being incurred. At the same time, the economy may be 
characterized as experiencing 1) a high rate of growth, 2) structural 
shifts away from agriculture, 3) heavy unemployment, 4) an incipient 
high rate of population growth held in check by positive net migration. 
The purpose of the remainder of this chapter will be to determine the 
degree to vfcich modifications of the Authority's operations would have 
affected the growth of the economy from 1950 through 1961. The primary 
concern will be directed toward the rate of growth, with secondary con­
sideration being given to the level of employment. The analysis will 
75 
concern itself only with the program of the Authority and not with other 
development programs undertaken by the Puerto Rican Government. 
The basis for this analysis will be a manipulation of the findings 
of Chapter IV. These results will then be incorporated with the growth 
model presented above. The first step is to determine the levels of in­
puts and outputs, by project, that would prevail under conditions of an 
optimum allocation of resources. Land was assumed constant, thereby 
introducing the arbitrary scale of operations necessary to make Euler's 
theorem hold in a homogeneous production function (14, pp. 64-65). Given 
land as a constant, the levels of capital and labor were derived, such 
that the first order optimization conditions were satisfied. The cor­
responding level of output was then derived. Table 21 gives the ob­
served average annual levels of inputs and outputs, by project, trans­
formed to correspond with the coding of the growth model. In Table 22 
the average annual levels resulting from the optimization procedures 
are shown. 
Various assumptions may now be made concerning alternative opera­
tional rules for the Authority. These assumptions may then be incorpora­
ted into the reduced form of the growth model yielding corresponding 
growth rates. Evaluating the integral, 
^0/2'' e " dt 
where r is equal to the average rate of growth for each of operating 
rules, will yield a set of total gross output figures for the period 
1950-1961. These may then be compared with the figure corresponding 
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Table 21. Observed average annual input and output levels. Land 
Authority, by project, 1950-1961 
Labor Land 
Gross output Capital (thous, (thous. 
Project (mil. $) (mil. $) man years) acres) 
Loiza 1.258 .695 .589 3.963 
Fajardo 1.515 1.028 .833 5.657 
Plazuela .869 .476 .387 2.737 
Cambalache 1.204 .605 .528 3.872 
San Vincente 1.002 .646 .532 3.753 
Toa 1.164 .566 .533 3.865 
Guanica 1.949 .866 .682 4.826 
TOTAL 8,961 4.902 4.084 28.673 
to the estimated rate of 6.21 percent found with the original data. 
Under these assumptions, various levels of positive net rents will be 
paid to the Authority. These rents paid will be averaged for the period 
and added to the government expenditures variable. Using equations 2 and 
3 above, we get the following equation: 
L - 580.859 - .075 G 
2t t 
providing a new estimate of the level of employment minus employment in 
the public sugar sector. Combining this with the appropriate employment 
figure. The observed levels for the total output for the period 1950-1961 
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Table 22. Optimum average annual input and output levels. Land Authority, 
by project, 1950-1961 
Project 
Gross output 
(mil, $) 
Capital 
(mil. $) 
Labor 
(thous, 
man years) 
Land 
(thous. 
acres) 
Loiza 1.045 .021 .440 3,963 
Fajardo .127 .059 .052 5.657 
Plazuela .570 .154 .349 2,737 
Cambalache .612 .266 .304 3.872 
San Vincente .508 .084 .185 3.753 
Toa ,454 .211 .166 3.865 
Guanica 2.651 1.834 .465 4.826 
TOTAL 5,967 2.629 1.961 28.673 
and the average annual employment for the same period are, 16,379.16 
million dollars and 571.000 thousand man-years respectively. 
The alternative operating rules deal with adjusting input and out­
put figures according to the data in Table 22, and modifying the profit 
distribution mechanism. 
Rule number one assumes that each project would be operated at a 
level such that the allocation of capital and labor would be optimized. 
From the imputed returns to land we can derive the net rents paid. 
Table 23 shows the derivation of the net rents. Under the conditions 
of rule number one there would have been $4,621,480,32 available to 
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Table 23. Net rents with an optimum allocation of capital and labor 
Imputed returns 
to land Rents payable Net rents 
Loiza 8,099,057.56 1,761,605.56 1,761,605.56 
Fajardo 234,666.14 1,966,534.68 -1,731,868.54 
Plazuela 1,325,897.10 1,110,252.00 1,110,252.00 
Cambalache 818,309.21 1,668,871.02 -850,561.81 
San Vincente 3,331,381.04 1,350,070.33 1,350,070.33 
Toa 1,129,044.78 1,187,054.72 -58,009.94 
Guanica 3,293,743.66 3,039,992.72 3,039,992.72 
TOTAL 18,232,099.49 12,084,270.13 4,621,480.32 
allocate to G 
t 
or an average of $355,498.46 per year. Output in the 
sugar sector would have fallen from $8,961,000.00 per year to $5,967,000.00 
per year. Under the second rule output is at the optimum level, but no 
profits are distributed. In this case, the total imputed returns to land 
would be available for allocation to G^. This figure includes over 6 
million dollars that could be termed profits. The average annual alloca­
tion to would be $1,402,469.19. 
Rules three and four are concerned only with the impact of modifica­
tions in the distribution procedure. Output levels remain the same. The 
only changes are found in the net rent figure. Under rule three, the 
project is assumed to be the accounting unit. Therefore all losses 
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incurred by farms within a project are covered by that project before 
the distribution of profits. Net rents are derived by subtracting 
profits from losses on those projects where losses are greater than 
profits. Where profits exceed losses on projects it is assumed that 
this money will be distributed. The sum of the losses in excess of 
profits (by project) is subtracted from the rents due as these losses 
would be covered from the general fund. Under rule three the net rents 
paid would be $3,205,408.34, or $246,569.87 per year. 
The fourth rule assumes that profit distribution is dispensed with 
entirely as in rule two. The exception being that output would remain 
at the observed level. In this case the net rents would be derived by 
subtracting total profits from total losses with any negative figure 
subtracted from rents due. Under rule four, total losses exceed total 
profits. Rents due would be $6,111,790.83, yielding $479,137.75 per 
year to be allocated to government expenditures. 
The result of applying these four rules to the growth model are 
shown in Table 24. The first column shows the average annual additions 
to government expenditures resulting from positive net rents being paid 
to the Authority. The new figure for G^, combined with the appropriate 
level of are applied to the reduced form of the model yielding the 
new growth rates in the second column. The figures in the third column 
represent the differences in the value of the integrals using the new 
growth rates as compared with the observed growth rate. The fourth 
column is self-explanatory. Changes in employment associated with the 
new values of and are given in the last column. 
Table 24, Impact of alternative operating rules for the Land Authority on the economy, 1950-1961 
Rules 
Average ad­
dition to G 
(mil. $) 
Rate of 
growth 
(percent) 
Change in 
total income 
(mil. $) 
Change in 
total income 
per year 
(mil. $) 
Change in 
employment 
(thous. 
man year) 
Optimum resource 
allocation .355 6.13 -147.63 -11.36 -2.150 
Optimum resource alloca­
tion with no profit 
distribution 1.402 6.23 +30.93 +2.38 -2.228 
Observed resource alloca­
tion with the project 
as the accounting unit .247 6.23 +30.93 +2.38 -.019 
Observed resource alloca­
tion with no profit 
distribution .470 6.26 +77.30 +5.95 -.035 
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Clearly, the outcome associated with the optimum allocation rule is 
unfavorable. All of the key factors; growth, output, and employment 
are lower than the observed levels. The only positive aspect is that 
the public subsidy to the Authority falls from $12,121,730,94 to 
$7,462,789.81 as a consequence of the positive net rent figure. This 
single benefit would be more than offset by the negative effects of ap­
plying the rule. 
These results may at first glance seem paradoxical. But when the 
general state of the economy is considered the seeming paradox vanishes. 
The Puerto Rican economy is in many ways analagous to the agrarian 
economies viewed by Georgescu-Roegen (11). His concern was with the 
situation of a traditional economy (non-capitalist, peasant) in which 
the marginal productivity of labor was at or near zero. Any decline in 
employment designed to equate the marginal productivity of labor with 
its wage rate would result in a decrease in the "maximum maximorum" 
available for the "government class" (11, p. 25). By the same token, 
a like adjustment taking place in an econony similar to that of Puerto 
Rico's would result in a decrease in the total product available for 
distribution. This is borne out by the results of applying rule number 
one. With unemployment already at a substantial level, labor resources 
released would have no alternative employment opportunities. The out­
put associated with these marginal workers, while lower than their wage 
rate, would be replaced by a negative output associated with the costs 
of additional unemployment. 
However, by changing the mechanism for the distribution of the 
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product, a different set of conclusions may be derived. Optimizing the 
resource allocation and deleting the profit distributing function as in 
rule two, we find that the rate of growth would be higher; and therefore, 
total output would be higher. However, the drop in employment would be 
slightly greater than under rule number one. In this case, there would 
be a total of $2.38 million per year available to compensate the slightly 
more than two thousand man years of labor displaced. The previous public 
subsidy would be replaced by a public profit over and above rents of 
$6,147,829.36, Whether or not this would be a more favorable position 
would depend upon the cost of compensating the additional unemployed 
workers and the value placed on the profit distributing concept. The 
amount of profits available for distribution under the optimum alloca­
tion rule would have been $8,788,158,75 with profits computed by project. 
On the v^ole, the gains derived from following rule two seem to be 
slight when viewed in light of the problems associated with additional 
unemployment, and the loss to workers of undistributed profits. 
Rules three and four are concerned only with adjustments in the 
profit distribution procedures. Under rule three, a total of 
$3,242,869.15 of wiiat had formerly been profits would have been profits 
would have been used to offset losses within the projects. This alloca­
tion would bring profits down to $2,906,382,49 from the observed level. 
By holding constant and increasing G^, growth would be enhanced by 
the same amount as under rule two. At the same time, the employment 
effects are negligible. The amount of subsidy, or rents foregone, would 
fall to $8,878,861.79. 
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By completely eliminating the profit distribution aspect of the 
program net rents would rise to $6,111,790.83 and the amount of rents 
foregone fall to $5,972,479.30. Growth, and the attendant increase in 
gross output, would be highest, and the employment effects would be 
negligible. This approach would have the disadvantage of requiring a 
revision of the very essence of the proportional-profit farm system. 
In ranking these rules as alternatives to the actual operation, it 
is clear at the outset that rule number one has little merit. The 
workers remaining on the farms would have improved their position as 
the profits available for distribution would have risen, while the 
number of workers receiving distributed profits would have fallen. The 
ratio of profits to wage bill would be .387 as against the actual ratio 
of .130. Even in the event that the displaced workers could draw com­
pensation from these profits, the negative output effect on the economy 
would rule out this procedure.^ 
The second rule would also be undesirable as it would have strong 
negative employment effects, and would require a complete revision of 
the proportional-profit farm concept. The positive growth and output 
effects associated with the second rule could be met equally as well 
by the third rule. At the Same time, the third rule would have negligi­
ble employment effects, and would only require a modification of the 
accounting procedure. This would retain the essence of the proportional-
profit farm concept and at the same time improve the output and growth 
^The increase in profits would amount to roughly $95.00 per year 
when distributed to the displaced workers. 
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picture. Thus, the third rule would be superior to the second rule. 
Finally, by completely eliminating any profit distribution and re­
taining the observed output levels, the maximum impact on growth could 
be achieved. The growth improvement could be achieved with a negligible 
impact on the level of employment. With the exception of the second 
rule, wherein the public received some six million dollars in profit, 
the fourth and final rule would produce the lowest level of rents fore­
gone, i.e., $5,972,479.30. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that, given the institutional 
framework, the Land Authority has pursued a quite reasonable set of 
procedures. The public subsidy involved, while nearly a million dol­
lars per year, does not represent resources directly diverted from some 
other activity but reflects a cost incurred, via rents foregone, to 
achieve a broader set of goals. 
It should be noted here that all of the production adjustments have 
been achieved by moving along a given production surface. There is no 
evidence that would suggest that the prevailing production functions 
were not the best possible given the available technology, cane varie­
ties, soil conditions, and other factors external to the sphere of 
management decision making. Any speculation concerning alternative 
production functions and their impact would be purely hypothetical. 
The profit distribution aspect does come under question however. 
Private investment capital cannot be considered scarce in Puerto Rico. 
The key factor is the ability of the government to provide the neces­
sary infrastructure that will allow the economy to absorb new investment. 
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These resources are scarce. Limits on the borrowing and taxing powers 
of the government coupled with the wide variety of public needs (37, pp. 
86-88, pp. 93-94) place a decided strain on the public resources. Thus, 
given the limited ability of the Authority to modify its production func­
tions, it might have been wise to forego profit distribution in favor of 
providing the public capital that would facilitate the overall develop­
ment program. Wages paid on the public farms averaged higher than 
either the industry wide average, or the average for the larger producers. 
Thus, even in the absence of profit sharing, the workers' position would 
have been improved. In addition to broadening the distribution of labor 
income through profit sharing and higher wages the Authority has used 
two other general procedures. First, projects sustaining consistently 
heavy losses have been retained as major producers thereby providing 
work opportunities that might not have been available otherwise.^ 
Second, the Authority has shared work %hen necessary spreading the 
number of man days of labor among a larger number of people than would 
be required with a full work week. There is no evidence that "make 
work" hiring has been undertaken to any substantial degree. As was 
pointed out earlier, this work sharing was a common practice in the 
^The Fajardo and Toa projects fall into this category. A test was 
made to estimate the impact of taking these out of production. The new 
estimated growth rate was 6.14 percent and the decrease in employment 
was 1.393 thousand man years per year. Undoubtedly some of the annual 
gross output loss of $8.15 million could be made up by putting the land 
released into other uses. There is, however, no other agricultural com­
modity with a ready market that could have the same impact as sugar. 
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pre-war years. There is no information as to the prevalence of the prac­
tice on private holdings during the post-war period. Undoubtedly, it 
still does take place in areas of labor surplus. The majority of the 
Land Authority holdings are in labor surplus areas of the island, the 
major exception being the Guanica project. 
The implications of dispensing with the profit sharing activities 
will be explored in the final chapter. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has been concerned with one phase of the Puerto Rican 
Land Law of 1941 — the proportional profit farm system. The program 
was designed to correct such problems as were felt to be associated with 
the large scale plantation cultivation of sugar, while yet retaining the 
efficiencies of large scale operation. The framers of the Law felt that 
the high degree of concentration of ownership and control prevalent in 
the sugar industry prior to 1940 brought with it a social pattern that 
hindered the development of the society. As was pointed out earlier, 
the plantation system was not found lacking in its ability to produce 
sugar, but in the external effects of this system. The major growers, 
largely absentee, dominated all phases of Puerto Rican life without 
truly being a part of that life (38, pp. 394-396), It was felt that any 
substantial improvements in the economic and social life of the island 
would necessitate major reforms in the basic industry. The vehicle of 
these reforms was to be the proportional profit farm program and other 
activities to be administered by the Land Authority of Puerto Rico, 
As a "policy means" within the Tinbergen theoretical framework, 
the proportional profit farm system is at the same time a reform, a 
structural change, and a policy instrument. As a reform, the program 
transfers productive resources from private to public ownership. The 
development of the decision making function into some form of industrial 
democracy, constitutes an incipient reform. Profit sharing as a mech­
anism of distribution represents a structural change in the manner of 
compensating factors of production. Finally, the ability of the 
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government to intervene in the determination of product level and mix 
and the input mix constitutes a policy instrument. As to specific goals, 
the Law was clear in calling for the elimination of corporate latifundia 
and the maintenance of productive efficiency on lands acquired. Thus, 
the reform and policy instrument aspects were the responsibility of the 
Land Authority while the structural change element was included in the 
original formulation of the Authority. In order to bring the findings 
to bear on an appraisal of the Authority's operation of the proportional 
profit farm system, each element of the policy means construct will be 
considered individually as they relate to the original hypotheses. They 
will then be brought together for an overview of the program. 
As a reform measure, the Authority was to eliminate corporate.lati­
fundia in Puerto Rico. Of the 188,817 acres of land held in violation 
of the "500 acre law in 1940" (27, p. 74), the Authority acquired 
93,299 or 49 percent. There is no evidence to suggest that illegally 
held lands have diminished in quantity by other means during the period 
in question. In fact, there might well have been a slight increase in 
amount of land in question.^ Thus, based only on the number of acres 
acquired, the program has failed to achieve this goal. What were the 
reasons for this failure? Essentially there are two factors that ex­
plain the failure of the program to eliminate corporate latifundia. 
The first of these deals with the scarcity of public resources in a 
context of competitive programs. In 1948, when major land acquisitions 
ceased, the Authority was faced with the problem of acquiring 95,518 
' ^Hernandez Agosto. o£. cit. 
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acres of land in the face of rising land prices. Using the extremely 
conservative figure of $200 per acre lAiich represents the average value 
of the Authority's sugar lands in 1950, the cost of acquiring these ad­
ditional lands would have exceeded nineteen million dollars. At the 
same time, the program emphasis of the government shifted from agricul­
tural to industrial development. The wisdom of this diversion of funds 
may be shown by an examination of the reduced form of the growth model. 
The elasticity of the rate of growth with respect to general government 
expenditures is 2.789, \diile that with respect to output in the public 
sugar sector is 0.060. There is no evidence to suggest that the transfer 
of ownership results in any significant increases in output. Thus, the 
funds to be used in the acquisition of additional lands would seem to 
have a greater impact on the economy when channeled into other uses. 
That this would be possible, brings us to the second reason behind 
the failure of the Authority to eliminate corporate latifundia. Stated 
simply, it is that by acquiring the lands it did, the Authority achieved 
the purposes relating to the elimination of corporate latifundia. As 
was stated earlier, the problem was not in corporate latifundia per se, 
but in its domination of the society. The situation in the late forties 
and early fifties was quite different from that prior to 1940. From a 
position of complete domination the sugar growers had become one of a 
group of interests in the society. The influence of the pre-reform 
political parties had waned to such a degree that the Constitution of 
1950 provided for opposition representation in the legislature lAiether 
seats were actually won or not. In the 1948 election the PDF won all 
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but one sat in the legislature. The electoral successes provided the 
basis for the vigorous reform and development programs instituted by 
the PDF (20, pp. 145-160). This is not to say that the drastic shift 
in the locus of political power can be explained solely as being due to 
the land reform program. However, the program was a central issue in 
the campaign of 1940, and certainly played a role in enabling the PDF 
to function. At the same time, the threat of future expropriations 
could be expected to elicit behavior patterns on the part of the sugar 
growers in line with those desired by the elected representatives. This 
could be, and was, achieved without actually committing the resourced 
required for expropriation. 
The emphasis on profit sharing in the formulation of the program 
was based on a vision of the future evolution of the system. The 
drafters of the program looked for the development of worker partici­
pation in management, and a decentralized management system. This was 
to be the second reform element of the program. From its very begin­
nings the directors found that this would not work. Attempts at de­
centralizing management failed primarily because of a lack of skilled 
personnel capable of running the farms. At the same time, the institu­
tion did not generate any appreciable change in worker's attitudes. To 
the worker, the Authority was still "the Corporation" (38, p. 282). The 
impact of the program on the laborers was felt in a somewhat different 
manner. Labor unions found their bargaining position strengthened when 
dealing with the Authority and were able to obtain somewhat better 
^Acosta Velarde. o£. cit. 
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contracts for their members. This is consistent with the higher average 
wages observed on the public farms. Union strategy was one of including 
some of the anticipated profits in the wage agreement thus stabilizing 
1 
worker incomes. The accounting system employed by the Authority was 
conducive to this policy. With the farm as the accounting unit, profits 
could and did vary widely. By including an increment of anticipated 
profits in the wage bill, total incomes of the workers tended to equalize. 
The reasoning behind this is quite sound, since we have seen that the 
performance of the farms is heavily conditioned by exogenous factors 
over which management has no control. By forcing up wages, income 
equality between farms could be approached, with individual farm losses 
covered from the land rent payments in the general fund. Higher wages 
plus profit sharing would be expected to strengthen the union's position 
when bargaining with private growers. No information was available with 
which to test this hypothesis. On balance, it can be said that the 
structural impact of the program has been to shift the distribution of 
the product in favor of labor. Net profits available for distribution 
amounted to $6,149,251.64 from 1950 to 1962, or 13 percent of the total 
2 
wage bill, while the improved position of labor enabled it to bargain 
for slightly higher wages than prevailed in the private sector. 
While the structural goal of shifting the distribution of the 
^Colon Torres. 0£, cit. 
^The accounts from which these figures have been drawn are on a 
crop year basis. The Authority publishes its major reports on an annual 
basis. Without more detailed information with regard to the accounting 
system the accounts are not fully reconcilable. Therefore, net profits 
available for distribution is used rather than profits distributed. The 
figures should be comparable over time. 
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product in favor of labor has been achieved. Table 24 shows that this 
has taken place at the expense of the broader goals of economic growth 
and full employment. In order to satisfy the distributional requirements 
of the Land Law the Authority has been forced to utilize the total amount 
of rent payments for the period. We see that by using rule number three 
in which the distributional procedure is modified, the rate of growth 
increases with negligible employment effects. A greater growth rate 
could have been achieved by completely eliminating the distributional 
concept. As with the modified rule, there would have been negligible 
employment effects, i.e., a decline of less than 100 man years on the 
average, due to the substitution of capital for labor. This raises the 
question of the validity of the profit sharing concept as employed by 
the proportional profit farm system in the context of developing econo­
my. The scheme has deprived the government of funds sorely needed for 
other developmental programs, which could have triggered a higher over­
all growth rate and subsequent income levels. At the same time, the 
idea must be viewed within the context of the Puerto Rican situation in 
1940. It was the considered judgment of the authors of the program that 
the mere transfer of ownership of these sugar holdings would have been 
unacceptable to the opposition within Puerto Rico and to the U. S. Con­
gress.^ In order to carry out the necessary reform measures, the PDF 
needed a program that would generate the least opposition. Previous 
^Acosta Velarde. 0£. cit. It should be remembered that the U. S. 
Congress exercised a veto power over actions of the Puerto Rican legis­
lature through the appointed Governor, by direct Congressional action, 
and by a variety of other pressures (20, pp. 403-408). 
experience with cooperative sugar production had not been encouraging. 
The inability of the Authority to move to decentralized management in 
later years suggests that they were correct with respect to cooperatives. 
Creation of small farm units approaching family size would have faced 
the same shortage of skilled managers in addition to the massive problems 
associated with coordinating production on many small farms with the 
needs of the sugar mills. The result was the choice of a compromise 
institution having features acceptable to a wide range of people, while 
retaining the desirable production organization of the plantation system. 
The system has clearly satisfied the intent if not the letter of 
the major reform objective, while failing to satisfy the implicit reform 
objective. The structural goal has been achieved, albeit at some cost 
in terms of the broader goals of economic policy. With regard to the 
position of the proportional profit farm system as a policy instrument 
and the goal of maintaining economic efficiency the pattern is reversed. 
The goals of economic growth and full employment have been pursued to 
the detriment of economic efficiency. The findings shown in Table 24 
clearly show that allocating the factors of production such that their 
MVP's equate with their prices would result in a sharp drop in both 
income and employment. Optimum allocation with no profit distribution 
would have produced a slightly higher income, but with a decline in 
employment. Clearly, the officials of the Authority have been faced 
with a dilemna. If they were to follow the goal of maintaining produc­
tive efficiency the result would have been a cut-back in production and 
employment with some of the cuts taking the form of moving whole farms 
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and groups of farms out of production. As we have seen, doing this would 
contradict the overall policy goals. On the other hand, their policy of 
maximizing physical output and employment has resulted in their failure 
with respect to the efficiency goal. 
The findings as stated, are certainly suggestive of other areas of 
research germane to the subject. A detailed analysis of wage determina­
tion in the sugar industry could be undertaken in order to determine the 
degree to which public operation of a portion of the industry influences 
overall wage patterns. There is a lack of information on the relation­
ship between the sugar industry and other sectors of Puerto Rican agri­
culture. An intensive study of this relationship would strengthen the 
analysis of the proportional profit farm system, and at the same time 
assist in providing guidelines for the future operation of the program. 
Also, a study of worker attitudes would be valuable as an explanation of 
vfoy no difference in attitude was found as betwen the public and private 
firms, A study of the agregado resettlement program (Title V of the 
Land Law) would shed some light on the degree of complementarity of the 
two programs. This is especially true as regards the reform aspect of 
the program. By giving workers tenure security in their homesites this 
program may well have enabled them to exercise their political franchise 
and participate in collective bargaining to a degree previously unknown. 
In fact, this program may well have been the key to the transfer of 
political poweri At the same time, by bringing rural workers together 
in accessible communities health and welfare standards could be improved. 
All of these factors could provide more information to agencies working 
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in this area of land reform. 
One key point that comes to mind is the relevance of the propor­
tional profit farms scheme for other developing nations. Clearly, the 
institution would seem to be worth considering as a reform mechanism in 
those areas wherein the plantation form of agriculture is important and 
where skilled managers are in short supply. However, the findings of 
this study are inseparable from the unique economic conditions prevail­
ing in Puerto Rico. The political link between Puerto Rico and the 
United States that allows for uncontrolled migration and the free move­
ment of capital make any generalizations with respect to other under­
developed economies risky at best. As was noted above, the actual rate 
of population growth was substantially lower than the natural rate of 
growth. This was due to the heavy rate of migration to the mainland 
United States. In fact, the years 1952 through 1954 witnessed an 
absolute decline in population (32, pp. 35-37). The accessibility of 
the mainland capital market, and the free repatriation of profits have 
been factors great importance in the industrial development of the is­
land. The studies by Baier (3) and Stead (37) are a step in the right 
direction, the true significance of the Puerto Rican relationship to 
the United States is still to be determined. Until this relationship 
has been adequately studied, we are in no position to say what would 
have been the outcome if capital were not allowed free movement, or 
population allowed free migration. 
Taking a broad view of the operation of the proportional profit 
farms, we can see that the Authority has balanced gains and losses off 
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in a context of competitive goals. The profit sharing mechanism certain­
ly may be questioned if the over-riding goal is increasing the rate of 
growth. However, in the Puerto Rican case a slight diminution in the 
rate of growth and subsequent higher income levels has been accepted as 
a price for a distribution of income more heavily weighted toward labor. 
If the sugar industry as a whole had not been going through a period of 
rising costs and declining yields the situation certainly would have 
looked better. In retrospect, it can be said that the choice of this 
institution as the mechanism for reform was justified in the context of 
1940, Furthermore, the operation of the program in its later years has 
been consistent with the overall goals of economic policy and of a 
generally beneficial nature. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Total 
63598 
62472 
60746 
60688 
60472 
57320 
52271 
51805 
46973 
45142 
46249 
43863 
42293 
Acres of land leased to projects 
Project 
Lolza Fajardo Plazuela Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanica 
4981 11682 8208 6537 9816 7786 10087 
9410 11670 8004 7217 8326 7766 10078 
7595 11363 8367 6925 8576 7819 10102 
7703 11365 8309 6993 8548 7769 10002 
7643 11346 8682 6993 8170 7642 9997 
6660 8834 11283 6924 7711 6006 9901 
6821 11161 4780 6239 8046 5341 9883 
6814 11161 4364 6176 8124 5317 9849 
6770 9333 4591 5585 6574 5092 9028 
6823 8880 3717 5515 6221 5090 8996 
6587 8123 5638 5515 6419 5024 8943 
6675 8103 3418 5515 6303 5019 8931 
6531 8047 3344 4726 6197 4909 8539 
Table 26. Average value per acre of land leased to projects 
Year Loiza Fajardo Flazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanica Total 
1950 224.94 172.90 159.22 253.58 139.31 169.06 292,26 200.46 
1951 225.79 172.89 159,68 257,17 166.77 168.65 292,11 206.79 
1952 235.34 162.00 167.11 266.30 161.15 167.33 291.41 205,85 
1953 236.19 162,07 167,05 266.16 161.47 167.87 293.03 206.39 
1954 223.85 161,71 161,20 266.15 167.47 169.26 292.26 205,00 
1955 252.59 205.03 174.83 268.80 177.39 202.01 295.32 223.87 
1956 248,15 161,98 -a _a 170.00 _a 295.62 213,96^ 
1957 248.23 161,98 
a a 
168.34 222.80 294.98 255,22^ 
1958 249,21 193.57 
a a a 230.64 305,10 261,16^ 
1959 250.04 197.38 _a _a 230.62 305.34 250.26^ 
1960 251.94 209,40 _a _a 202.62 229.54 307,02 254.56^ 
1961 252.14 209,82 _a _a 106.29 229.39 306,87 255,76^ 
1962 253.34 210.68 _a _a 208.14 224.88 311.82 259.25^ 
^No values are available due to the transfer of lands to the Conos Tiburones developmental 
project. 
Includes lands transferred to the Conon Tiburones developmental project. 
Table 27. Net profits by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Flazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanlca Total 
1950 56,434.14 3,853.84 184,499.55 129,156.73 262,052.92 77 ,944. 29 236,586.50 950,627.97 
1951 83,557.44 16,819.39 144,096.97 133,756.78 219,437.24 92 ,830. 19 522,905.64 1,213,403.65 
1952 46,961.59 988.67 87,214.83 54,509.62 216,771.14 29 ,020. 41 259,462.59 694,928.85 
1953 —  — - 28,289.09 46,034.99 132,410.97 --- 102,233.43 308,968.48 
1954 13,197.19 -  — —  56,671.63 49,786.64 131,309.13 —  —  - 141,809.05 392,773.64 
1955 64,287.42 11,776.51 43,677.15 114,681.94 179,366.80 —  — —  139,013.26 552,803.08 
1956 77,681.18 9,516.08 61,046.53 58,952.82 106,535.09 —  —  —  304,349.48 618,981.18 
1957 62,020.10 — — - 8,529.77 109.63 57,361.34 —  — - 225,313.25 353,334.09 
1958 3,325.77 - - - 2,492.67 6,200.70 27,899.34 —  — —  14,302.15 54,220.63 
1959 11,413.97 ,  - - - 23,434,21 94,346.43 ' 48,693.24 —  —  —  78,120.75 256,008.60 
1960 24,128.01 --- 11,602.82 4,531.30 -  -  - —  — —  65,048.48 105,310.61 
1961 27,912.46 —  — - 13,707.91 4,021.87 —  —  —  356,519.26 402,161.50 
1962 • — — - 2,873.68 607.88 242,247.80 245,729.36 
TOTAL 470,919.27 42,954.49 652,455.22 708,749.17 1,386,466.96 199 ,794. 89 2,687,911.64 6,149,251.64 
Table 28. Losses incurred by project and year 
Project 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela Gambalache San Vincente Tea Guanica Total 
1950 117,807.66 203,602.92 - - - - - - — — - 26,697.93 3 ,174. 86 351,283, .37 
1951 80,751.81 268,896.12 73,980.91 3,201. 22 13,316.70 52,840.17 492,986 .93 
1952 87,028.24 198,808.47 25,256.55 17,717. 25 2,749.07 86,859.07 - — — 418,418 .65 
1953 335,717.83 799,511.51 61,295.00 41,672. 90 32,853.88 286,767.68 31 ,675. 96 1 ,589,494 .76 
1954 144,968.61 515,425.62 74,974.11 35,350. 29 22,953.25 179,315.66 2 ,491. 12 975,698 .66 
1955 5,727.66 277,558.66 97,620.16 6,318. 27 8,480.99 225,968.09 17 ,961. 73 639,635 .56 
1956 23,918.03 160,945.67 3,075.12 8,938. 69 38,460.87 338,481.33 - - 573,819 .71 
1957 29,888.92 425,786.00 53,771.57 125,987. 05 89,231.90 337,439.91 13 ,058.95 1 ,075,164 .30 
195 S 135,519.04 527,771.82 36,446.89 132,883. 68 102,996.49 273,739.45 111 ,399. 65 1 ,320,747 .02 
1959 169,191.59 560,965.76 46,367.41 24,231. 22 66,334.92 260,666.80 148 ,013. 66 1 ,275,771 .36 
1960 93,758.07 491,258.13 66,762.20 80,688. 03 195,809.58 240,874.56 37 ,381. 51 1 ,206,532 .08 
1961 124,894.06 415,306.06 123,796.43 59,125. 28 138,153.32 159,991.03 --- 1 ,021,266 .18 
1962 217,853.85 . 310,391.38 142,795.62 72,819. 69 191,093.30 245,958.03 1 ,180,911 .87 
TOTAL 1,567,025.37 5,156,228.12 806,141.97 609,153. 57 902,434.27 2,715,590.20 365 ,157. 44 12 ,121,730 .94 
Table 29. Gross income per acre, by project and year, with averages by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincsnte Toa Guanica 
1 
Average 
Average 317.43 267.77 317.56 311.06 301.17 266.95 
1 
403.69 311.63 
1950 310.72 302.06 290.32 303.75 332.36 254.26 401.81 314.88 
1951 348.00 292.78 309.03 308.08 318.95 290.54 440.75 328.20 
1952 348.64 332.22 334.55 282.19 351.84 308.32 411.95 338.39 
1953 286.08 227.23 309.79 315.15 325.58 257.56 391.34 297.86 
1954 290.13 239.58 309.73 331.95 309.03 253.13 421.56 304.15 
1955 324.67 269.85 324.07 347.79 343.79 251.02 426.02 323.61 
1956 353.36 279.51 357.80 326.23 298.64 249.76 411.32 323.46 
1957 313.45 217.36 276.73 251.10 253.23 218.46 391.17 273.80 
1958 . 288.33 217.64 296.83 289.53 259.51 245.36 297.25 266.70 
1959 300.07 255.40 360.58 340.20 277.57 297.30 363.45 308.33 
1960 301.04 251.90 319.76 309.93 259.37 262.31 351.97 293.16 
1961 335.39 307.62 334.68 335.43 287.20 296.69 485.98 343.51 
1962 319.38 317.86 318.50 294.41 295.56 275.89 458.40 329.19 
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Table 
Year 
Aver; 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Non-land expenditures per acre, by project and year with averages by project and year 
Loiza Fajardo 
Project 
Plazuela Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanica Average 
310.72 313.03 298.06 276.99 267.40 297.33 318.67 297.45 
287.23 288.88 212.24 231.30 243.82 255.24 305.13 259.28 
312.77 297.66 261.61 243.19 245.38 259.16 291.65 275.86 
322.98 332.59 314.30 242.40 277.43 295.32 313.48 302.29 
326.55 323.95 298.08 283.06 275.27 300.00 324.40 305.94 
293.67 294.55 294.57 293.40 256.91 271.63 331.90 291.19 
283.71 286.36 327.40 280.96 264.80 279.72 334.72 293.97 
305.24 278.89 289.78 278.30 252.30 327.03 294.08 288.67 
277.27 266.21 270.53 255.53 234.09 306.85 300.76 271.50 
299.92 293.07 273.70 291.79 249.95 311.86 272.46 284.51 
319.83 342.06 339.48 297.52 260.72 367.43 333.98 320.59 
303.32 353.19 311.44 299.42 287.27 319.53 310.73 312.66 
337.19 389.08 368.50 319.82 306.30 316.27 373.00 344.14 
368.22 384.41 362.58 282.34 334.83 322.94 365.76 346.94 
o 
00 
Table 31. Capital expenditures per acre, by project and year, with averages by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanica Average 
Average 175.44 
149.69 
181.68 174.07 156.31 146.50 172.22 183.49 170.23 
1950 157.26 115.78 119.21 115.12 112.47 150.54 133.99 
195;. 157.94 160.82 140.47 131.49 126.36 118.30 157.30 143.38 
1952 155.42 173.78 175.84 128.98 139.03 141.56 167.48 155.65 
1953 172.07 176.29 171.08 154.88 145.80 163.28 180.33 166.73 
1954 162.92 164.54 168.10 164.27 140.14 145.57 189.92 162.24 
1955 163.46 163.92 209.72 164.37 148.46 162.40 201.80 173.19 
1956 180.97 156.91 164.61 157.74 136.85 195.70 165.88 164.89 
1957 157.93 153.03 152.92 146.72 125.08 182.08 175.28 155.02 
1958 181.71 180.75 160.71 171.87 142.37 205.00 163.11 171.85 
1959 200.74 214.19 202.66 161.49 140.03 243.97 189.53 192.56 
1960 189.69 236.60 196.98 182.41 171.10 222.91 191.31 198.55 
1961 209.24 252.07 233.93 190.85 174.95 202.70 223.84 211.85 
1962 249.10 250.24 241.56 170.03 208.84 210.86 224.91 222.45 
Table 32:. Man-days of labor per acre, by project and year, with averages by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincents Toa Guanica Average 
Average 371.13 36.83 35.35 34.11 34.49 35.44 35.32 35.76 
1950 45.61 46.37 33.64 40.36 44.57 40.17 52.50 43.85 
1951 50.47 44.75 41.41 34.82 36.84 46.67 41.37 42.36 
1952 52.73 49.82 42.37 34.39 42.62 48.53 43.22 45.30 
1953 44.55 45.10 36.41 36.93 38.44 40.28 41.07 40.73 
1954 36.45 36.14 34.12 36.20 32.37 35.54 38.09 35.61 
1955 35.09 34.42 38.74 33.92 33.08 40.49 36.52 35.99 
1956 36.80 35.49 37.17 37.23 33.29 37.55 35.05 35.95 
1957 30.71 26.78 30.53 28.58 28.42 30.15 30.40 29.07 
1958 29.88 27.08 28.84 30.93 27,68 25.60 26.37 28.02 
F'' 
30.88 30.84 37.11 37.70 36.07 28.14 32.27 33.08 
1960 28.36 28.74 29.69 34.74 33.12 21.64 29.29 29.49 
1961 28.14 30.94 34.88 30.72 34.41 23.44 26.27 29.24 
1962 25.10 26.86 23.94 26.64 29.26 22.29 26.05 25.93 
Table 33. Acres harvested, by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanlca Total 
1950 5083 6679 3864 4028 4487 5011 5603 34765 
1951 4751 6860 3480 4094 4281 4614 5207 33432 
1952 4822 6768 3526 4470 4310 4443 5166 33505 
1953 4335 6357 3209 4290 4110 4503 5007 31906 
1954 4408 6649 3413 4123 4225 4388 4476 31751 
1955 4165 6588 3471 3038 5671 4160 4167 30153 
1956 3511 6100 2187 3599 3828 3170 4447 27019 
1957 4124 6134 2405 3734 3961 3083 5111 28590 
1958 3206 5092 2056 3185 3622 2809 4954 25105 
1959 2943 5198 2111 3834 3950 3018 4743 25796 
1960 3730 3739 2020 3573 3611 3097 4631 24401 
1961 3495 3959 1893 3846 3401 3195 4794 24582 
1962 2951 3417 1849 3628 2792 3304 4426 22369 
TOTAL 51524 73540 35585 50342 50249 48795 62732 373379 
Table 34. Wages per day, by project and year, with averages by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanica Average 
Average 3.64 3.57 3.51 3.54 3.51 3.53 3.83 3.56 
1950 2.82 2.84 2.87 2.78 2.89 2.81 2.94 2.86 
1951 3.07 3.06 3.22 3.21 3.17 3.02 3.25 3.13 
1952 3.18 3.19 3.27 3.30 3.25 3.17 3.38 3.24 
1953 3.47 3.28 3.49 3.47 3.37 3.40 3.51 3.42 
1954 3.59 3.60 3.71 3.57 3.61 3.55 3.73 3.62 
1955 3.43 3.56 3.04 3.44 3.52 2.90 3.65 3.36 
1956 3.38 3,44 3.37 3.24 3.47 3.50 3.66 3.44 
1957 3.89 4.23 3.92 3.81 3.84 4.14 4.13 4.01 
1958 3.96 4.15 3.92 3.88 3.89 4.18 4.15 4.02 
1959 3.86 4.15 3.69 3.61 3.35 4.39 4.20 3.87 
1960 4.01 4.06 3.86 3.37 3.51 4.47 4.08 4.52 
1961 4.55 4.43 4.25 4.20 3.82 4.85 5.68 4.52 
1962 4.75 5.00 5.06 4.22 4.31 5.03 5.41 4.80 
Table 35. Land rent per acre harvested by project and year, with averages by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Plazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanlca Average 
Average 34.19 26.74 31.20 33.18 26.87 24.33 48.46 33.29 
1950 39.62 37.16 25.00 38.63 29.60 22.60 59.36 37.00 
1951 38.57 30.63 28.50 34.61 25.41 22.10 47.93 32.54 
1952 36.82 27.88 27.09 31.66 22.95 25.98 47.08 31.28 
1953 37.84 27.97 29.74 31.97 27.65 20.38 49.82 32.13 
1954 30.41 23.00 30.17 34.74 25.86 21.79 56.77 31.36 
1955 27.86 23.97 29.98 35.81 30.91 22.98 62.21 32.95 
1956 35.69 25.67 39.66 33.70 28.12 28.02 50.26 33.99 
1957 29.06 20.92 30.57 20.08 25.22 22.18 49.00 29.32 
1958 85.11 25.34 38.53 41.41 29.61 30.03 43.53 34.11 
1959 39.48 22.72 31.94 27.49 22.75 26.67 48.88 31.39 
1960 34.19 31.79 34.64 33.21 26.51 25.08 38.63 30.49 
1961 33.25 24.41 36.58 28.80 23.60 27.47 40.25 30.40 
1962 35.53 24.39 36.47 29.86 34.08 26.01 35.81 31.58 
xao it 
Year 
Aver; 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
Tons of sugar cane harvested per acre, by project and year, with averages by project 
and year 
Project 
Lolza Fajardo Flazuela Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanica Average 
32.55 28.31 34.78 34.77 34.12 28.76 36.45 32.54 
32.57 32.05 31.64 37.39 36.25 28.23 37.79 33.62 
33.47 28.17 31.56 32.55 32.26 27.22 37.00 31.59 
35.06 33.74 35.42 33.83 37.64 32.86 38.57 35.25 
28.29 22.65 • 32.27 32.56 32.65 26.02 32.88 29.10 
31.68 26.53 33.31 36.72 35.38 28.19 38.05 32.34 
31.74 26.42 31.63/ 35.03 35.84 26.23 37.46 31.74 
37.51 28.99 40.75 37.64 37.23 29.04 36.52 34.64 
29.97 20.60 30.63 26.46 25.93 22.08 31.67 26.22 
31.52 24.13 36.25 33.32 30.87 28.33 27.43 29.46 
30.94 30.69 42.81 37.63 33.93 33.81 36.30 34.00 
29.96 28.68 34.95 37.02 33.32 29.94 35.55 32.10 
35.64 34.22 40.49 38.48 35.24 32.65 45.26 36.84 
35.76 36.23 40.77 33.42 36.97 30.78 40.16 35,11 
Table 37. Tons of sugar per acre harvested, by project and year, with averages by project and year 
Year Loiza Fajardo Flazuela 
Project 
Cambalache San Vincente Toa Guanlca Average 
Average 3.56 3.00 3.58 3.56 3.40 2.96 4.42 3.36 
1950 3.85 3.76 - J  4.10 4.16 3.23 5.03 3.96 
1951 3.85 3.14 3.47 3.36 3,65 3.12 4.77 3.16 
1952 3.79 3.47 3.58 3.16 3.80 3.39 4.72 3.71 
1953 3.05 2.39 3.51 3.55 3.65 2.82 4.07 3.24 
1954 3.39 2.78 3.55 3.82 3.60 2.90 4.73, 3.48 
1955 3.77 3.18 3.j3 3.93 3.99 2.89 4.80 3.68 
1956 4.12 3.26 4.22 3.89 3.68 2.82 4.57 3.74 
1957 3.45 2.32 3.13 2.78 2.72 2.34 4.10 2.95 
1958 3.21 2.44 3.52 3.29 2.88 2.70 3.16 2.98 
1959 3.34 2.88 4.09 3.85 3.12 3.29 3.98 3.40 
1960 3.34 2.67 3.61 3.59 2.89 2.88 3.80 3.20 
1961 3.48 3.24 3.55 3.68 3.02 3.07 5.11 3.56 
1962 3.38 3.29 3.36 3.17 3.06 2.76 4.56 3.29 
